The Role of Information Technology in the pursuit of National Interest: An Examination of Diplomatic Actors in Kenya in the 21st Century

Background to the Study

The objective of this study is to examine how information technology can enable diplomatic actors to enhance Kenya’s National Interest. Another key objective is what tangible opportunities are there for growth regionally and globally for the Kenyan ICT ecosystem. The hypothetical assumption is that these two objectives are mutually beneficial. Ndemo posits that historically, since Kenyan independence from the British in 1963, ICT was a second-tier ministry under transportation. The Kenyan government barred the use of computers, fax machines, and any other communication gadgets as policy under the Official Secrets Act.[1] Ndemo being an academic and policy maker instrumental in the comparative advantage Kenya enjoys in ICT within East Africa and indeed within Africa argues that had Kenya not invested in the ICT sector earlier on, for example, the TEAMS fiber cable which was a PPP partnership with UAE, we would not have reaped the benefits of economic development, financial inclusion and the mobile money revolution that became M-PESA now renown globally.[2] Indeed Ndemo, notes Kenya’s approach through strategic leadership in the ICT sector was liberal whereas its East African neighbor states pursued a conservative approach that hindered innovation and creativity.

Kenya’s strategic policy to invest domestically combined with the rapidly advancing information technology ecosystem on the global stage is a case study of how simultaneous forces of globalization and localization seem to be having an impact in how states interact with each other. An example of such a force is technology, more specifically information technology which has played a crucial role in the acceleration of globalization. Technology plays a key role in wealth creation, raising standards of living and real economic growth in any society. Science, technology, and the development of nations and society are all proportional to each other. For example, Kenya’s internet penetration rate of 39% compares very favorably with its neighbors Tanzania (4.4 %), Ethiopia (1.9 %), and Uganda (16.2 %) this has consequentially had an impact on its economic development and the spillover benefits into other sectors.[3] Economic growth and economic development are key foreign policy objectives diplomats are tasked with pursuing. The use of information technology as a strategic enabler or tool by diplomats to carry out their core functions of administrative work and delivery of foreign policy objectives in the 21st is certainly an area of study that is scarcely examined.

Developed countries are already taking preemptive actions to control the area around the global governance of information technology, as a result, they are consolidating their interests domestically and on the international stage. For example, ICANN[4] the global organization tasked with internet governance was founded in 1998 but only recently opened its first African engagement office in Kenya in 2016. Kenya is also one of two African countries that will host ICANN root server clusters, for which their purpose is to offer faster internet in Africa as a whole.[5][6] Kenya also reaffirmed its position on the African continent by being reelected for 4 years on the 48-member Council of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) based in Romania. The ITU is the United Nations special agency for Information Communication Technology (ICT).  Kenya is also a global leader in the mobile money transfer industry which is a major stakeholder within the Kenyan ICT ecosystem.[7] These examples highlight the unique position Kenyan diplomats and bureaucrats are in to leverage their ICT capabilities to enhance its national interests. The need to stay ahead regionally and globally through innovation, laissez-faire regulation, and governance is crucial. The need for more research and policy-making to maintain Kenya’s comparative advantage is a gap this study seeks to examine.

However, an issue of concern is that the rate of advancements in information technology is increasingly challenging the authority states have over their territories, and in the process, various private sector stakeholders are challenging the once unquestioned authority of sovereign states. In this digital era of internet proliferation and social media platforms, the democratization of information has had an impact on the political, social, and economic spheres cutting across borders indiscriminately. Consequently, digital diplomacy and internet activities are increasingly being used by diplomats to counteract and project their state’s foreign policy positions to domestic and foreign audiences. In the context of international relations, power is the fundamental factor when examining states in the international system, more precisely the mastery and control over key resources and capabilities to influence international affairs. In this case, information technology is also increasingly being considered as a tool for exercising power.[8]

 

Foreign policy is implemented by various diplomatic actors which include foreign ministers, government secretaries, and ambassadors on diplomatic assignments in foreign countries, who are increasingly using every technological advantage available, to achieve their foreign policy objectives.[9] This approach is the traditional diplomatic model that can be used by diplomats in the implementation of foreign policy objectives.  However, the impact of technology is now increasing phenomenally in the modern world and leveraging technology for military, economic or social gains is becoming the norm. This study explores from a different dimension the nexus of information technology and diplomacy using both the integrative model of diplomacy and the traditional diplomatic model.[10] The integrative model of diplomacy in the context of this study advocates for the inclusion of specialists in the field of technology, working with diplomats or as diplomats towards a common goal, the national interest of the state.

 

The Research Problem

States are likely to experience challenges in the pursuit of their national interests. The realist school of thought posits that states are the most important actors in an international system which is often an anarchic environment where resources are limited, and the selfish pursuit of national interest is key. These challenges may be national, regional or international. The lack of a clear definition of interests and the policies to be pursued by diplomatic actors within the state can create internal challenges. As a result, this can undermine the mid-term and long-term competitive advantage of Kenya on the international stage. Indeed, other internal operational challenges that tend to exist are having enough financial and human resources to support Kenya’s foreign policy goals and enhance the capacity of its diplomats to implement them. Lastly, competition and duplication of roles among MDAs may lead to uncoordinated diplomatic engagement by the Kenyan government.

In this context, diplomats historically have had the exclusive responsibility of collecting information or intelligence in support of their state’s national interests.[11] Their main responsibility is gathering information or intelligence on different issues of interest and communicating the same effectively back home. This information includes the economic status of host states, the host states alliances, the domestic political landscape of host states, judicial systems, and military assets among other issues.[12]

Thus, bearing in mind the roles our diplomats play in the pursuit of Kenya’s national interests, they now operate in a different environment, the digital age. The onset of the 21st century saw the proliferation of the use of information technology by billions of people across the world. This means billions of people are interconnected by sharing information, collecting information, and storing information. The rapid rate of innovation and ingenuity means that traditional diplomats need to adapt at the same pace or find that they may no longer have the information or intelligence required to pursue the interests of their states which is their primary role. The huge scope of information communication technology and innovations have increased access to the amount of information accessible by diplomats as they strategically align themselves to seize, analyze, and act upon them.[13] Indeed diplomats across the world are adapting to the changing landscape and making use of the advances in information technology to shape the narratives of the states they represent. For example, posting opinion pieces on social media platforms, managing and responding to issues via social media accounts, and appearing on online for debates, and discussions via podcasts or online versions of radio such as Twitter spaces to name a few. Diplomats are making use of information communication technologies to receive and mold information from a worldwide audience.[14]

The virtual platforms that now exist, are indeed useful in connecting people. Distance, time zones, and cost of communication have virtually been nullified thanks to advances in information technology. This timely access to information and flow of communication has shifted the nature of work diplomats do and taken an integrative approach.[15] However, the lack of integrative diplomacy in leveraging information technology in Kenya to achieve foreign policy objectives that promote and further national interest is a problem this research seeks to delve into. For example, as opposed to the traditional sources of intelligence diplomats rely on to carry out their statecraft such as HUMINT and TECHINT, a large amount of OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) that can be gathered from open sources to produce actionable intelligence is untapped. This is an area in which advanced information technology can greatly assist in collecting and analyzing information at a cheap cost and effective manner. This is where diplomats can rely on specialists under an integrative diplomatic model.

Essentially, the advances in information and communication platforms mean that currently crucial information is shared rapidly and thus in need of rapid, precise analysis and evaluation in response.  The challenge is adoption of modern ICT in Kenya and Africa at large, is subject to setbacks such as unreliable ICT infrastructures. Resources ranging from hardware to software on which IT runs are expensive to procure, protect, and maintain. Procuring annual licenses to renew software adds to the cost as well as the ever-present vulnerability to cyberattacks. Another important issue is the intellectual property rights of the technology being used. Cyber insecurity and cyber espionage, ineffective legislation and governance structures, tedious processes of establishing regulations and rules governing technological integration to diplomacy, ineffective and inefficient platforms to make critical decisions, and invading diplomat’s privacy are some of the problems this research will examine.

Lastly, there is also the challenge of Kenyan diplomats being able to identify and access the strategic ICT resources available to them within Kenya before looking beyond its borders. An area of concern in the private sector is that up to 70% of technology startups in Kenya are not earning enough to maintain business and living expenses for even minimally staffed businesses and only 3% have partnerships with government agencies.[16] Another issue with IT stakeholders, excluding established technological firms such as Safaricom for example, is the reliance on publicity and solicitation of investments locally and internationally without tangible outcomes or commercially and strategically viable products.[17] The value of the Kenyan ICT sector has consistently grown over the last 20 years and accounts for 7% of Kenya’s GDP. It is also considered a best prospect industry sector by international investors.[18][19] These figures indicate this sector as an important one in bolstering the other sectors like agriculture and tourism which have traditionally been the major contributors to Kenya’s GDP.

These issues emphasize the need for further research on how information technology as a tool can affect service delivery by diplomats and their mandate of securing the state’s economic interests.

 

 Literature Review

Debates and Critiques within Science &Technology in International Relations

International Relations as a discipline in the Social Sciences has two conflicting perspectives on science and technology which influences how the integrations of science and technology in International Relations as a discipline have been received. It has informed the biases where science and technology have only been studied with a bias on the military particularly on the subject of nuclear warfare which was established as a discipline after the Second World War. The debates surrounding science and technology are based on two views which are an optimistic view (the story of hope) and a skeptical view (the tale of pessimism).

The optimistic view assumes that science and technology often lead to the development and improvement of human life. It further offers solutions to global challenges such as security, health, food and eliminates poverty. This Optimistic view considers science and technology as the sole drivers of efficiency in urban planning, reproduction, and economic empowerment[1]. Also, the proponents of this view regard the development of smart technology as a catalyst for wealth generation and thus decent lifestyles within “planetary boundaries”[2]. International entities such as the World Bank and the UN are seen to foster development and allow technological sharing towards fulfilling the development agenda for all. This is the guiding principle realization of UN Millennium Development Goals[3]. From this, therefore; the guiding philosophy behind science and technology is the high expectation for continuous improvement and progress for humanity. Critiques to this view argue that the optimist view assumes that there are unending opportunities and inevitable success in all technologies and scientific knowledge, but scientific knowledge is determined by powerful modern ideologies and historical experiences within different political and economic systems[4]

The pessimism debate argues that technology is neither innocent nor neutral. This debate sees individuals and collective life emerging through oppressive scientific and technological aspects. Technology is neither neutral nor static, it expresses inhuman ambitions[5].For instance the role of scientific and technological capabilities in the bombings during World War II and even during the Holocaust[6]. Also, science and technology are seen to have been implicated in colonial domination, racism, and exploitative suppression of what was known as the “White Mythology.” This perspective has been supported by more IR scholars hence showing why it has not been fully integrated into International relations. This school of thought informs scholars’ perspectives such as Henry D. Thoreau, Max Weber, and Martin Heidegger.[7] The pessimistic view proponents advocate for anti-nuclear proliferation because of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Digital advancement is also seen as an opportunity to be used as an instrument of State oppression, censorship, and espionage which further erodes personal freedom and privacy[8]

 Concept of National Interest

Many political theorists and philosophers maintain that nations are driven by self-interest which is normally referred to as ‘national interest’ or raison d’etat’.[9] Moral, religious, and other altruistic considerations may also be included as part of the national interest if they are considered as such by the nation. Discussions on national interest assume that the state is the supreme good.[10] This is not only the basis of the Hegelian theory of the modern totalitarian state but is also true of any narrowly conceived nationalistic ideas. From this understanding, the continued existence of the state as an independent entity becomes the overarching objective. The other possible explanation, which is more consistent with democratic theories, is that the state is a tool designed to meet the desires of its people.

Despite these different perspectives, it is generally accepted that states are the entities which define their interests and determine how they will achieve them[11]. This raises the question of who within the state defines the national interest and what should count when the national interest is being defined.[12]This has given rise to differences in opinion between those who believe that national interest can be arrived at objectively and rationally and those who see the definition of national interest as the struggle among various subjective views and preferences, a struggle in which the national interest is the political outcome.[13]

Despite the diversity in definitions, there have been attempts to define the national interest in more concrete terms using criteria such as military, economic, ideology, morality, and legality, to mention but a few. One such notable attempt has been by Donald Nuechterlein.

 

Donald Nuechterlein defines national interest as, “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which comprise the external environment.”[14] According to him, national interests can be divided into four basic categories as follows; “defense interests” which are concerned with the safeguarding a nation-state, its type of governance, and its people from external attacks and control; “economic interests” which entail the economic advancement of a country in the external environment; “world order interests” which are concerned with the creation of a conducive international environment for the country to pursue its interests; and “ideological interests” which are concerned with the promotion of the country’s ideals beyond its borders.[15]

 

Furthermore, he identifies four levels of measuring the intensity of an interest as follows;[16] The first level is “survival issues” which are concerned with the very existence of a country. A country will commit all its resources as a matter of priority to protect its independence from external attacks and control, and if need be, go to war to safeguard it.[17] For an issue to be considered as survival, the threat to the country should be one that will lead to massive physical harm and must be credible and immediate.

 

The second level is “vital issues” where serious harm is likely to occur to a country if it does not take robust action to deal with threats from another state. These may include protection of national unity and stability; gaining mileage over adversaries; having resources to pursue its interests; and immunity from intimidation and freedom from subversion or sabotage by other states.[18]A vital issue can threaten the survival of a country but differs from a survival issue in that it affords the state sufficient time to resolve it. A state may forgo other interests and even go to war, to safeguard its vital interests, if it can do so without risking its existence.

 

The third level is “major issues” where the well-being of a country may be negatively affected by what is happening in the global scene and therefore requires remedial action to stop the situation from degenerating into serious threats. If a state is to prosper, its policies and relationships must be adjusted to address the situation and to change it to its greatest advantage or least disadvantage. Such strategic interests include those arising from the strengthening or weakening of adversaries and allies; shifting international alignments and patterns of influence; discovery of new resources and technologies; changes in the international state system and in regulatory regimes established under it; the emergence of new patterns of economic development and trade, as well as new doctrines and ideologies; and challenges to the status and treatment of its citizens and their property abroad.[19] It is in the interest of a country to maintain an international order and state system favoring its continued independence, its capacity to cooperate with other states in addressing matters of common concern, and its ability to effectively promote and defend the broad range of its national interests.

 

The last level is “peripheral issues” where the interests of individuals and companies operating abroad may be affected by what is happening in those countries. This includes changes in multilateral or bilateral agreements regulating trade, finance, travel, and other activities of companies or nationals abroad; foreign respect for national laws, institutions, and frontiers; the international operations of ships and aircraft; status of diplomats, military officers, and state property; communication between governments and peoples, or due deference to national sovereignty or dignity.[20]

 

Hans Morgenthau another scholar who has attempted to define national interests sees it in terms of power. He sees power as being important for the survival of a country and therefore avers that it is in the interest of all states to acquire power.[21] In this regard, he posits that any action or policy that advances a country’s power promotes its national interests while any action or policy that does not maximize its power is not in its national interests.

 

The national interests of a country can be permanent in character and can be categorized into major and minor interests.[22] Some interests must be defended at all costs, others can only be protected in certain situations while others, while important cannot be protected. It is therefore the role of foreign policy to decide the relative importance of each interest to guide its decisions and actions in the international arena. Securing the national interests of a nation is therefore critical in ensuring its independence, and territory, and promoting the welfare and tranquility of its people.

 Technology and National Interest

A key point in this study is the significance of technology in the 21st century in the context of national interest. However, how significant is it? Economist Brad DeLong notes that the 140 years between 1870 to 2010 have been the most consequential years of all humanity’s centuries. If we compare the 140 years to the at least 300,000 years Homo sapiens have been around it represents 0.05 percent of that history. Delong posits that something incredible happened in that sliver of time that eluded our species for the other 99.95 percent of our history, technological advancements. We got the industrial research lab, the modern corporation, and then full globalization around 1870. The industrial research lab rationalized and routinized the discovery and development of technologies; the corporation rationalized and routinized the development and deployment of technologies; and globalization diffused them everywhere. As a consequence, the unprecedentedly rapid change in technology brought with it profound political instability and conflict. The most negatively impacted has been the global south who were denied much of the benefit of the world’s economic revolutions while suffering the bulk of the harm from the ensuing political and social revolutions.[23]

New scientific and technological advancements have indeed had a direct impact on the conduct of International Relations. The international system has seen a shift in power relations since the Industrial Revolution to date, with the focus shifting from hard power to soft power. The realist’s perspective of state-centric actors has been impacted by the onset of communications technology for instance, which has opened this space, even more, to include non-state actors in the international system. Globalization of technology has impacted information, trade and commerce, general interactions, and even the conduct of state business among others.

Science and technology have had a profound influence on the way states relate. Recent developments in the field have had the impact of radically transforming since the Westphalian conference. For centuries the state was at the epicentre of the international system. The state took pride in the territory among other elements as a source of power. However, this long-held belief by the state is at risk of being challenged in the contemporary international political dispensation under the influence of science and technological advancement. One seminal piece of research on this topic is a paper by Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, titled “The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in the Evolution of Global Politics.” In this paper, the authors argue that ICTs have facilitated the emergence of transnational networks and have allowed for the formation of new kinds of global governance structures.[24] For example, ITU, ICANN among others. They also discuss the ways in which ICTs have disrupted traditional power dynamics and have given rise to new forms of political activism. James N. Rosenau, in the book titled, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, discusses the ways in which information technology has contributed to the emergence of a more complex and fluid international system. He argues that ICTs have facilitated the formation of new transnational networks and have created new opportunities for global cooperation and conflict.[25] Thus states which are utilising these networks to their interests have an advantage.

Technology, as well as science have been defining the prevalent environment in international relations in each technological epoch. International relations have continued to be shaped by advances in technology as it has determined the power structure as witnessed during the Second World War and the Cold War Era. Nuclear weapons put an end to the Second World War. For a long time, scientific and technological advancements have traditionally had militaristic underpinnings and were influenced mainly from a state power perspective in the international system. Even though the military might be no longer the sole determinant in shaping the international order, it’s importance cannot be understated. Power politics are still a core factor in IR and superpowers pursue military might. States are still in pursuit of more sophisticated weaponry to either wad of security threats from other actors or to impose their might over the weaker states.

 Technology and Diplomacy

Information technology has had a significant impact on the field of diplomacy and international relations. One of the key ways in which IT has changed diplomacy is by facilitating communication and information sharing between individuals and organizations. For example, the widespread use of email and other digital communication tools has made it easier for diplomats to communicate with each other and with their counterparts in other countries. Another way in which IT has impacted diplomacy is by enabling the development of new forms of international cooperation and coordination. For example, the use of online platforms and social media has made it easier for diplomats to collaborate on projects and initiatives and has facilitated the sharing of information and resources. In addition, IT has also played a role in facilitating public diplomacy and increasing transparency in the diplomatic process. For example, many governments and international organizations now use social media and other online platforms to engage directly with the public and provide information about their diplomatic efforts. This has helped to increase transparency and accountability in the diplomatic process and has allowed for greater public participation in international affairs.

Amitav Mallik in his book ‘The Role of Technology in International Affairs’ argues that foreign policy and diplomacy have always been key precursors of statecraft. The digital age in the 21st century demands that statecraft should leverage on the advances in technology to facilitate instant communication and revolution.[26] In the information age, intelligence services are no longer the only organizations with the resources and capabilities to collect, analyze, and transmit information. Private companies, think tanks, and other non-governmental organizations now have the ability to gather and analyse data and disseminate their findings to a wide audience. This has led to increased competition for intelligence services, as they must compete with these other organizations for access to information and for the attention of policymakers and decision-makers.

One of the main implications of the information age on intelligence is the increased importance of open-source intelligence (OSINT). In the past, intelligence agencies relied heavily on secret sources, such as spy networks, to gather information. However, with the rise of the internet and social media, a vast amount of information is now readily available from public sources. This has led to a shift towards OSINT, which involves collecting and analysing publicly available information from a variety of sources, including the internet, media, and social networks. Another implication of the information age is the increasing use of data analytics and machine learning in intelligence analysis. These technologies allow intelligence agencies to process and analyse vast amounts of data quickly and accurately, enabling them to identify patterns and trends that may not be visible to humans. However, there are still challenges for example the difficulty in verifying the accuracy of information, the threat of disinformation, and the ethical implications of collecting and analysing personal data. Intelligence organizations are having to adapt to these challenges in order to remain effective in the 21st century.

Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne in their book The Practice of Diplomacy: its Evolution, Theory, and Administration argue that the development of diplomacy has been closely intertwined with that of information, communication and technology.[27]

Joseph Nye in his thesis on the role of technology in promoting interdependence observed that technology has enhanced the capacity of various actors in the global political economy leveraging on physical and social technologies. He further argues that the global interdependence has blurred the traditional distinct between national and international space leading to internal issues of a country impacting the international policies. On the same Thomas Friedman argued that technology has really played a very crucial role in leveling the platform of managing issues across the globe by enabling anyone, anywhere have access to the same information, and have a say in how that information is received, connect to the outside world as one does businesses directly with each other without meeting physically thus can, for example, enable a diplomat in positively projecting a country’s foreign policies through foreign audiences.[28]

Nicholas W. the former chief information officer Foreign and Commonwealth Office – London argues that the adoption and frequent use of technology has weakened the traditional nation-state by allowing different state and non-state actors to act across national boundaries. In his study he demonstrates that technological knowledge in the contemporary world has become an important component for retaining diplomatic effectiveness and for meeting diplomatic challenges in the global arena. He interrogates the effect of technology and the structures it operates within diplomacy and the rapid change happening in the current world affairs.[29][30]

 Kenya’s Information technology capacity, diplomatic actors, and the pursuit of national interest.

In East Africa in the period since the end of colonialism into the post-colonial era, Kenya has positioned itself as a dominant economic player in the region. This can also be said of the information technology sector where Kenya is the preferred source of skilled labour and plays host to numerous multinational and transnational companies in the same sector. However as is the nature of international politics, states compete to attract the limited resources available in the form of foreign direct investment and trade to drive their economic growth. Kenya has witnessed increasing competition from its neighbours some of whom have access to natural resources like minerals which they leverage to achieve their foreign policy objectives, especially in the area of economic development. In this context, Kenya’s diplomats seek to maintain its dominant position in the region by leveraging its information technology capacity to secure its national interests.

Traditional diplomatic actors and information technology actors through integrative diplomacy can work together. Digital diplomacy does not actually replace traditional face-to-face diplomacy. Traditional and digital diplomacy can co-exist and complement, rather than compete with, each other. Digital diplomacy and internet activities can greatly assist in projecting a state’s foreign policy positions to domestic and foreign audiences.[31]

Traditional diplomatic actors in line with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations[32] and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations[33] offer service delivery via embassy and consular work, especially to their constituents in the diaspora. This includes collection, storage, and sharing of information or intelligence, both classified and public information. Integrating information technology in the conduct of diplomacy is an emerging tool that has been embraced by developing countries such as Kenya. It is being observed that there are several tools through which technology has been infiltrated into diplomacy notably – Websites, Twitter, YouTube, WeChat, WhatsApp, and Facebook. [34]There is also a niche being created where sophisticated technology such as Big Data, Machine Learning, and Artificial Intelligence is being leveraged by diplomats to make their decision-making processes more precise and effective.

There are roles that traditional diplomatic actors and specialists in information technology can take in addressing survival, vital, major and peripheral national interest issues. There is a case for more collaboration between these different sets of actors in the 21st century where technology is a defining feature of relations between states. Information technology is influencing the skills and knowledge required by diplomats today to be able to deliver their nation’s interests. The efforts have shifted to focusing on concerns and communicating with a wider audience. Information technology has also changed the decision-making structure in embassies where a decentralized approach is being adopted. Thus, a low-level diplomat has the incentive and leverage to act on issues of concern before such issues become complicated to handle.  This can happen due to the ease of access to crucial information in almost real-time and the tools available to enable them to analyze and make decisions.

However, the MFA faces huge challenges when we consider first, they handle sensitive classified information and secondly, the bureaucratic politics model or government bargaining model of foreign policy decision-making could mean they face stiff opposition from other government agencies in implementing their policies.[35]  Thus, securing information from cyber-attacks and having access to credible data from other MDAs in as an issue of concern. It is also important to note that when states collaborate in the area of technology in general, either with other states or non-state actors they cannot separate themselves from their national science and technology policy agendas but do so in pursuit of their interests.[36]

 The Kenyan Information Technology Ecosystem.  

The Kenyan information technology ecosystem is characterized by the unique and diverse actors it is made up of. Each of these actors from the government (MDAs), corporate sector, SMEs, Startups, Academia, International bilateral development agencies, IGOs, and specialized agencies are pursuing their interests rather than working as an amalgamated unit.  Examining the academic, regulatory, and policy gaps to enable Kenya to leverage its information technology capacity will be key in consolidating the efforts of different stakeholders and harnessing it into a single strategic goal. The conceptualization, planning, and implementation of the strategy will hypothetically maintain and increase Kenya’s comparative advantage in the ICT sector. Adoption of an integrative model of diplomacy, as opposed to the traditional diplomatic model, can be the strategic alternative used by diplomats in the implementation of Kenya’s ICT foreign policy objectives.

Technology and National Interest: Experiences from other regions in the world

America, China, and Israel are clear-cut examples of the strategic use of technology to pursue selfish national interests. These states view science and technology as instruments of foreign policy or sources of technical information for the management of ongoing international regimes based on treaties. This is perhaps the most straightforward use of science and technology in foreign affairs as an instrument to be employed for a clearly defined objective as a tool of foreign policy in a bilateral relationship or in an established international regime.[37][38] They have leveraged technology to maximize economic growth as a broader alternative in their national security strategies apart from military strength. What is also similar is that they use technology as a tool of pursuing the national economic interests using government and even private sector stakeholders to achieve their goals.

NSO Group the notorious maker of spyware Pegasus, can literally hack any mobile or digital device across the globe. For nearly a decade, the Israeli firm had been selling its surveillance software on a subscription basis to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world. NSO’s product Pegasus seems to solve one of the biggest problems facing law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the 21st century: that hostile states, criminals and terrorists now have better technology for encrypting their communications.[39] This means investigators and counterintelligence agencies must decrypt them. Despite human and civil rights issues being raised, states from different ideological stand points recognise the need for the software and its use in securing national interests by gathering crucial intelligence. The software which has been successfully used to track and neutralise terrorist cells, drug cartels, international paedophilia rings, but has also been used against human rights activists, opposition politicians and journalists. It is the duality of its use that makes it a controversial technology. However, the Israeli government in conjunction with its judicial system and Ministry of Defence protects and classifies the technology company as a national security asset for their nation. This underlines their real politick approach to the issue choosing security over privacy. NSO Group and similar companies have been made to be a central component Israel’s National security strategy to advance the country’s interest around the world entangling them with the country’s diplomatic dealings with other states.[40]  A similar stance seems to be adopted by the USA although not publicly while China does not seem to care about the issue of privacy as a right as it pursues and promotes digital surveillance .

The USA has set up the office of science and technology policy whose mission is to maximise the benefits of science and technology to advance health, prosperity, security, environmental quality, and justice for all Americans. The Biden administration has tasked the office with the goal of ensuring that the USA is the world leader in the technologies and industries of the future that will be critical for its economic prosperity and national security. It also recognises China as a threat in this context. Niche technologies such as artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, have been identified as areas that will give the USA a competitive advantage in the future.[41]

China on the other hand is locked in a strategic technology competition with the United States. China knows its power to influence the international economic, trade and security landscape rests with advancing its technological prowess. Scientific and technological innovation is the main battlefield of the international strategic game, as declared by Chinese President Xi Jinping.[42] China is also forging strategic partnerships through its private sector technology companies like Huawei, to strengthen the technological capabilities of nations across the globe they an alliance with. In Africa, for example in Kenya, Huawei was a key technology partner for Safaricom M-PESA, when the M-PESA servers were transferred from Europe back to Kenya. China already provides more financing for information and communications technology than all multilateral agencies and leading democracies combined. [43] Partly due to pressure from a National Security and Cybersecurity perspective, Safaricom Kenya PLC’s multivendor strategy has pitted Huawei China, Finnish rival Nokia, and rival US technology companies all bidding for their 5G rollout tenders. This is a signal that USA, China and other major players in the field of technology are ever vigilante looking for opportunities for their companies abroad. Indeed, diplomacy is key when seeking for such opportunities. It is their diplomats in the host countries who are at the frontline to ensure the investments are secured in the interest of their home country. With Safaricom Kenya and M-PESA Africa expanding into markets beyond our borders; Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa, Afghanistan, Lesotho, DRC, Ghana, Mozambique and Egypt, our diplomats will be crucial in defending and securing those interests even if they may be considered peripheral in the larger scheme of things.

 

   Key partnerships and engagement by Kenya with the regional and global community in ICT.

 

  1. Kenya hosts the African Telecommunications Union (ATU), a regional body that seeks to promoted development of ICTs in Africa in order to achieve universal access, and inter-country connectivity.
  2. Kenya is host to the African Advanced Level Telecommunications Institute (AFRALTI), a regional intergovernmental human capacity-building institution. The AFRALTI is one of the designated ITU Centers of Excellence.
  3. Kenya is an active member and the current chair of the East African Communications Organization (EACO), a regional body for ICT regulators and operators.
  4. Kenya is host to the African Regional Engagement Office for the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
  5. Kenya is currently served by four international submarine optical fiber cables that connect the country to international information superhighway. These cables also link the neighboring land-locked countries within the Eastern and Central Africa to high-speed international connectivity.

 

 Theoretical Framework

 Realism

This study will utilize realism to analyze how Kenya can secure its national interests through use of soft and hard power. The realist theory would be utilized to explain how and to what extent Kenya can utilize hard power to secure its national interests. Soft power can also be viewed as a form of power and one way of getting desired outcomes. In this context utilizing the capabilities and resources information technology provides Kenya whether in government or the private sector can also be viewed as an opportunity to secure its interests like military strength.

The realist theory traces its origins to the works of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau.[45] Realists maintain that there are laws that regulate individual and state behavior. States are driven by self-interest and are likely to pursue their interests to the disadvantage of others despite the existence of laws regulating humans and relations among nations. States are considered the main players in an international system which is anarchical in nature, as there is no world government to enforce the rule of law and punish those who do wrong. In this regard, it is difficult to have one authority at the international level as no nation would be willing to surrender their independence to another body or government. In such a situation, there are opportunities for Kenya seize the strategic advantage even in those areas that may seem mundane and less significance such as information technology.

Realists see global politics as characterized by the struggle for power with each nation focused on ensuring its own interests.[46] They therefore posit that competition to acquire power as a means of securing national interests is the main driver of world politics, and in that regard, most states crave military power. This study examines another alternative which is also important, economic strength through leveraging technology.

Major realist scholars have touched on a variety of themes on technology, diplomacy and national interest and how they interconnect. Morgenthau defines political realism as “the recognition of the facts of life, namely, the imperfections of human nature and the absolute limitations of human knowledge.” According to him, political realism is characterized by a focus on the national interest, a belief in the inherent conflict between nations, and a recognition of the role of power in international relations.[47]  On the role of technology in international relations, Morgenthau argues that technological advancements can significantly shape the balance of power between states and affect the conduct of foreign policy. In his book Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau discusses the impact of scientific and technological progress on international relations, arguing that it can both enhance and undermine the power of states.[48] Waltz argues that the fundamental driving force in international relations is the distribution of power among states. According to Waltz, states seek to maximize their power in order to protect their national interests and ensure their survival in an anarchic international system. Technology and diplomacy are important tools that states can use to pursue their interests and increase their power.[49]  Mearsheimer another renown realist scholar has applied his theory of offensive realism to a wide range of issues related to technology, diplomacy, and national interest. In his influential book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer argues that states will always be motivated to acquire advanced military technologies in order to increase their power and security relative to other states. He also argues that states will use diplomacy as a means of advancing their interests, but that ultimately, power politics will determine the outcome of international relations.[50]   Mearsheimer has also written extensively on the role of technology in shaping international politics, including the impact of nuclear weapons on the balance of power and the potential for emerging technologies such as cyberwarfare to disrupt international relations.[51]  In his view, the acquisition and use of advanced technologies by states will always be driven by considerations of national interest and the desire to gain a competitive advantage over other states. Gilpin partly supports this point of view and argues that the spread of new technologies can create both opportunities and challenges for nations. He discusses the role of economic factors in shaping international relations and the ways in which technological innovation can affect the distribution of power among nations. Gilpin posits that through the strategic development and utilization, technology can be a key factor in determining the outcome of international conflicts.[52]  For example, he notes that the United States has often used its technological superiority to achieve its foreign policy objectives.[53]

Social Constructivism

This theory argues that science and technological artifacts are developed and are culturally constructed, interpreted and are shaped by social processes.[1] This theory opens up a black box of technology and reveals multiple social forces that shape and influence science and technology.[2] The strength of this theory is seen as its ability to apply the method to gathering knowledge on societies’ relations with science and technology[3]. However, the main critique of this theory is that it views societies as composed of groups that are seen as a pluralist view. This standpoint fails to consider the aspect of power symmetry between groups and how this affects science and technology[4].Furthermore, “Social Constructivism Theory is attached to an ontology of separateness between humans and non-humans, which privileges human agency in social and technology interactions”[5][6]

According to Wendt, states and other actors in international relations do not have fixed identities or interests, but rather, their identities and interests are shaped by the way they interact with one another. This means that technology, diplomacy, and national interest are all shaped by the social and cultural context in which they take place. He argues that the concept of anarchy in international relations is not a given, but rather, it is a social construct that is shaped by the way states interact with one another. He suggests that the way states perceive and respond to anarchy has important implications for the use of technology and diplomacy in international relations.[7]  In addition Wendt also notes the importance of understanding the social and cultural context in which international relations takes place. He argues that this is particularly relevant for understanding the role of technology and diplomacy in shaping national interest.[8]  Onuf on the other hand suggests that these concepts, technology, diplomacy, and national interest, are not fixed or objective, but rather are constructed and shaped by the interactions and communications between individuals and groups. For example, the development and use of technology is not simply a matter of objective scientific progress but is also influenced by the cultural and political context in which it occurs. Similarly, the concept of diplomacy is not fixed or universal, but is shaped by the cultural and historical contexts in which it takes place and by the power relations between different actors.[9]

Actor-Network theory

It was developed in the 1990s to compensate for the shortcomings highlighted by social constructivism theory. The Actor-network theory is defined by Baron and Gomez[10] as “a sociological approach, which focuses on description and analysis of associations between natural, human and technological entities.” It brings in the aspects of interactions between humans and non-human agents and how they generate information and communication networks and systems[11] and how these dynamic relational aspects are useful in the study of change and the unintended outcomes of science and technological projects.[12] Actor Network Theory is a way of understanding how social, technological, and other kinds of networks are constituted and how they operate. It emphasizes the importance of non-human actors in the shaping of social and cultural phenomena and sees humans and non-humans as equally important in the construction of social reality. According to Actor Network Theory, the relationships and interactions between actors (which can be human or non-human) are what give rise to social structures and systems. Actors are seen as having agency, or the ability to act and make decisions, and they can be linked together in networks through various forms of exchange and interaction. In the context of technology, Actor Network Theory can be used to understand how technology shapes and is shaped by social and cultural processes. It can also be applied to the study of diplomacy and national interest, as it can help to reveal the various actors and networks that are involved in international relations and the ways in which they interact and influence one another.[13] [14]

Functionalism

Functionalism is a theory of international relations that originated in the early 20th century. It is based on the idea that international institutions and organizations can help to promote cooperation and coordination among countries by providing a forum for negotiation and conflict resolution. In this sense, functionalism sees international organizations as a means of achieving national interests. In the context of information technology, functionalism theory suggests that the development and use of information technology can facilitate cooperation and coordination among countries by enabling the sharing of information and expertise. For example, Mitrany argued that the development of new technologies, such as transportation and communication systems, can help to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas among different countries, which can in turn help to reduce misunderstandings and build trust. In addition to technology, Mitrany also emphasized the importance of national interest in shaping international relations. According to his theory, countries are more likely to cooperate with one another when they perceive that their national interests are aligned, and that cooperation on functional tasks can help to promote mutual interests and reduce conflict. The process of cooperation can indeed be hastened by advanced technology.[15] Deutsch argues that international organizations and institutions play a vital role in the functioning of the international system and the maintenance of international order. He posits that these organizations and institutions perform important functions, such as facilitating communication and cooperation among states, regulating the behavior of states, and promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes. In terms of technology, he argues that technological innovations can lead to changes in the way that societies function and interact with one another. For example, the development of new communication technologies, such as the mobile phone and internet, have had a significant impact on international relations and diplomacy by allowing countries to communicate and negotiate with one another more quickly and efficiently. In the context of functionalism and national interest, states and other actors in the international system pursue their own self-interest in order to achieve specific goals or functions.  In this way, information technology can help countries to achieve their national interests through international cooperation. Functionalism theory in international relations highlights the role of international institutions and information technology in promoting cooperation and coordination among countries, which can ultimately serve the national interests of participating states.[16][17]

Liberalism

Liberalism is a theoretical perspective in international relations that emphasizes the role of individual freedom, democracy and the market economy in shaping international politics. In the context of information technology, liberalism would suggest that widespread use of information technology has facilitated the spread of individual freedom and democracy, by allowing individuals to communicate and exchange information more easily and freely. Additionally, the use of information technology has also facilitated the growth of the global market economy, by allowing businesses to operate more efficiently across national borders.

In, Perpetual Peace, Kant outlines his vision for a world order based on the principles of republican government and cosmopolitan law. He argues that peace is not merely the absence of war, but rather a state of affairs in which individuals are able to live together in harmony and mutual respect. To achieve this, he proposes several measures, including the establishment of international institutions and the adoption of a cosmopolitan perspective that recognizes the inherent value of all people. Kant recognizes the importance of national interest in shaping foreign policy. He argues that states should pursue their own interests, but they should do so in a way that is consistent with the principles of justice and respect for the rights of others. In Kantian context technology can have the potential to bring people closer together and facilitate cooperation, but also the use of technology can be a means of domination or coercion.[18]  Locke’s political theory of natural rights which include the right to life, liberty, and property, and the importance of the social contract, are what he views as the basis for the legitimacy of government. According to this theory, individuals come together to form a government in order to better protect their natural rights and to provide for the common good. In return, they agree to give up some of their individual freedom in order to be governed. In the context of technology, the use of science and technology could be guided by the same principle of the, common good, which Locke saw as the overall well-being and prosperity of society. Thus, the pursuit of knowledge and the application of technology should be directed towards the benefit of all members of society, rather than just the interests of a few individuals or groups.[19]

Overall, liberalism would argue that the widespread use of information technology has had a positive impact on international relations by promoting individual freedom, democracy and the market economy. In terms of national interest, liberalism would argue that the use of information technology can promote national interest by supporting individual freedom and democracy, and by fostering economic growth and prosperity.

 

Marxism

Marxism is a theoretical perspective in international relations that is based on the ideas of Karl Marx, who argued that international relations are primarily driven by economic interest and class conflict. According to Marxist theory, the dominant class in a society controls the means of production and uses its economic and political power to exploit the working class and advance its own interests. In the context of information technology, Marxism would suggest that the widespread use of information technology has facilitated the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a small group of elites, who use this power to advance their own interests at the expense of the working class.

Marx in his seminal book, Capital, discusses the role of technology in the production process and how it can be used to increase productivity and profits. In the context of this study, Gramsci’s a Marxist theorist, concept of cultural hegemony, which refers to the dominance of a group or ideology over others in a society is applicable to how the bourgeoisie is maintaining its power of over the proletariat using technology. In Gramsci’s view, the ruling class uses its control over the means of cultural production, such as the media, education, and arts, to maintain its power and influence. This control is similar to the one being wielded by the few capitalist businessmen which technological companies that wield influence worldwide for example, Amazon, Microsoft, Google to name a few. This cultural dominance can be maintained through the development of a “hegemonic ideology,” which is a set of shared beliefs, values, and norms that are accepted as natural and common sense by many people in a society.[20]  Miliband who is also a key Marxist theorist examines the role of technology and diplomacy in shaping national interests. In his book, The State in Capitalist Society, he argues that the capitalist state serves the interests of the capitalist class, and that technology and diplomacy are key instruments that the state uses to further those interests.[21]  Cox has developed a theory of Marxism that emphasizes the role of technology, diplomacy, and national interest in shaping the dynamics of global political economy. He argues that the global political economy is shaped by the way in which different societies organize production, and that this is in turn influenced by the technological capabilities and social relations of production that prevail in each society. He also contends that the international system is shaped by the actions of states and other international actors, and that their interests and goals are shaped by their domestic social forces and the ways in which they are embedded in the global system.[22] Thus, Marxists would argue that national interest is ultimately the interests of the ruling class, and that information technology is often used to further these interests.

Theoretical Approaches in science and technology

The theories of Science and Technology can be studied from two perspectives, which answer the following questions; Does technology shape society or does society influence our technological choices? The first perspective argues that science and technology shape societies fall under the technology determinism while the second view society shapes science and technology fall under the social shaping of technology and is associated with social constructivism and actor-network theory.

Technology shaping societies theories

Technological determinism

The proponents of this theory argue that technology shapes societies which are informed by different aspects which can be soft or hard.  Andrew sees this theory to be based on two theses which are;

  • It assumes that the pattern of technology is fixed and that it moves along one direction in all societies
  • With the above then all social organizations and societies must adapt to the progress of each stage of technology which is “Imperative” requirements of technology[23]

Therefore, technology becomes an external force acting on its own from a metaphysical beyond.

Societies shaping technology

This approach emerged in the 1980s and different theories developed from this perspective which was constructivism and actor-network theory. Constructivism was developed by scholars such as Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker while actor-network theory was developed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon.[24] The social shaping of science and technology argues that technology is seen as a reflection of society and not as an external force. Secondly, science and technology does not follow its own pace but is shaped by social factors. Thirdly science and technology are open to negotiation and change and finally, it argues that technological artifacts are changed by the users[25].[26]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Sasvari, P, The Effects of Technology and Innovation on Society (Bahria University Journal of Information and Communication Technology, 5(1) 2012)

[2] Prell, C. Rethinking the Social Construction of Technology through” Following the Actors” ( A Reappraisal of Technology Frames. Sociological Research 14(2) 2009)

[3] Ibid

[4] Klein, H.K., & Kleinman, D.L The social construction of technology: Structural consideration (Science and technology & Human Values 27(1) 28-52 2002)

[5] Baron, L.F., & Gomez, R, The Associations between Technologies and Societies: The Utility of Actor-Network Theory (Science, Technology Societies, 21 (2), 129-148 2016)

[6] https://brettideas.wordpress.com/2017/06/08/scot-vs-ant-a-comparison-of-theories

[7] Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425

[8] Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. International Security, 20(1), 71–81.

[9] Onuf, Nicholas. “Constructivism: A User’s Manual.” In International Relations in a Constructed World, edited by Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, 58-78. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

[10]Ibid Baron &Gomez (2016)

[11] https://brettideas.wordpress.com/2017/06/08/scot-vs-ant-a-comparison-of-theories/

[12] Greenhalgh, T., &Stones, R. Theorizing big IT programs in healthcare: strong structuration theory meets actor-network theory (Social Science &Medicine, 70(9),1285-1294, 2010)

[13] Latour, B. (1991). Technology is society made durable. In J. Law (Ed.), “A Sociology of monsters: essays on power, technology, and domination”, London: Routledge, pp. 103-131

[14] Callon, M., & Law, J. (1995). Agency and the hybrid collective. South Atlantic Quarterly, 94(2), 481-507.

[15] Mitrany, D., & National Peace Council (Great Britain. (1946). A working peace system: an argument for the functional development of international organization. National Peace Council.

[16] Deutsch, K., Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationalism. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953)

[17] Deutsch, K. (1964). The nervous system of international politics. In E. J. Hobsbawm (Ed.), “Industry and empire: An economic history of Britain since 1750” New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 438-456

[18] Kant, I. (2018). Perpetual Peace. Franklin Classics.

[19] Barker, E., Hopkins, G., Locke, J., Hume, D., & Rousseau, J.-J. (2013). Social contract: essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau. Oxford University Press.

[20]   Gramsci, A. (2011). Prison notebooks. Volume 1. Columbia University Press.

[21] Miliband, R. (2009). The state in capitalist society. Merlin Press ; [Black Point, N.S.

[22] Cox, R. (1987) Production, power, and world order: Social forces in the making of history. Columbia University Press.

[23] Feenberg,. A (2002). Transformation Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press

[24] http://www.sfu.ca/cprost/docs/CPROST%20report%2005-01%20Salazar.pdf

[25] Bijker, W.E, Understanding technological culture through a constructive view of science, technology and society. In C.Mitcham (Ed), (Visions of STS: Counterpoints in Science, Technology and Society Studies  Albany State University of New York Press 2001 pp 19-34)

[26] http://www.sfu.ca/cprost/docs/CPROST%20report%2005-01%20Salazar.pdf

[1] Kurzweil, R. The Singularity is Near: When humans transcend biology (New York: Vikings 2006)

[2] Byrne, J. and Glover, L Ellul and the weather (Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society(2005)

[3] United Nation, Statistics and Indicators for the post-2015 development agenda (New York: UN Publishing 2013)

[4] Adas, M. Machines as the measure of men: Science, technology and ideologies of western dominance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989)

[5]  Feenberg, Questioning Technology (East Sussex: Psychology press 1999)

[6] Thad, Allan, M, Modernity, the Holocaust and machines without history in A.C. Hughes, M. Thad Allan, and G.Hecht (Eds) Technology and power Essy in honor of: Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge: MA MIT 2001)

[7] Berman, M. All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity (London: Verso 1983)

[8] Deibert, R. J,.Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, Zittrain, J. (Eds.) Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2010)

[9] Frankel, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy; An Analysis of Decision-Making, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp 54-55

[10] Ibid, pp 55

[11] Papp, Daniel S, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding 5th edition, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), pp 43

[12] Ibid, pp 44

[13] Couloumbis, Theodore A and Wolfe, James H, Introduction to International Relations; Power and Justice, 4th edition, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1990), pp 97

[14] Nuechterlein, Donald E., National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making, British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Oct., 1976) pp. 246-266

[15] Ibid, pp 246-266

[16] Ibid, pp 246-266

[17] Op.cit, Freeman, Chas. W, jr. pp 9-10

[18] Op.cit, Freeman, Chas. W, jr. pp 9-10

[19] Op.cit, Freeman, Chas. W, jr., pp 10-11

[20] Ibid, pp 11-12.

[21] Morgenthau, Hans J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2001), pp5

[22] Thompson, Kenneth W and Macridis, Roy C, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy in Macridis Roy ed, Foreign Policy in World Politics, 3rd edition (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp 2

[23] J. Bradford DeLong. (2022). Slouching Towards Utopia. Basic Books.

[24] Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2011). The Role of Digital Media. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 35–48. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0041

[25] Rosenau, J. N. (2018). Turbulence in World Politics A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton University Press.

[26] Mallik, A. (2006). Role of Technology in International Affairs. New Delhi: Pentagon Press: Institute of Defense Studies and analyses

[27] Hamilton, K. A., and Langhorne, R., (1995). The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration. London: Routledge.

[28] Nye, J. S. Jr. (2011). The future of Power. New York: Public Affairs

[29] Westcott, N. (2008). Digital Diplomacy: The impact of internet on International Relations, Oxford Internet Institute, research Report

[30]http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/108975/RAMLANIS%20NOV%202019.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1

[31] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2017.1297175

[32] https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf accessed on 14/12/2022

[33] https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf accessed on 14/12/2022

[34]http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/108975/RAMLANIS%20NOV%202019.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1

[35] Allison, Graham T., and Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, pp. 255–313, p. 300.

[36]https://www.nacosti.go.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2021/Docs/Draft%20Science%2C%20Technology%20and%20Innovation%20%28STI%29%20Policy%202020-2030.pdf

[37] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-015-9286-1?code=b1bf1bad-41bc-48d8-b65b-c3c16fda5ecb&error=cookies_not_supported

[38] Weiss, C., (2015). How Do Science and Technology Affect International Affairs? Minerva. 53. pp 411–430

[39] http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=113781

[40] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/magazine/nso-group-israel-spyware.html accessed on 09/12/2022

[41] https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/01/15/a-letter-to-dr-eric-s-lander-the-presidents-science-advisor-and-director-of-the-office-of-science-and-technology-policy/ accessed on 10/12/2022

[42] https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahwince-smith/2022/06/29/building-a-new-technology-diplomacy-for-the-21st-century/?sh=6018ecb0312b accessed on 10/12/2022

[43] https://techonomy.com/tech-diplomacy-an-urgent-imperative-as-china-strengthens/ accessed on 11/12/2022

[44] Institute for Security Studies, ISS, (2018), Made In Africa Manufacturing and the fourth industrial revolution. Jumia. (2018). KENYA Mobile White Paper 2018.

[45] Jill Steans et al, An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes, 3rd edition, (London, Pearson Education Limited, 2010), pp 53-57

[46] Ibid, pp 53-57

[47] Morgenthau, H. J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948)

[48] Eldridge, S., & Morgenthau, H. J. (1947). Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. American Sociological Review, 12(2), 236. https://doi.org/10.2307/2086992

[49] Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979)

[50] Mearsheimer, J. J., (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton.

[51] Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990) Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. Atlantic Monthly, 266(3) pp. 35-50

[52] Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press,1987)

[53] Gilpin, R., & Gilpin, J. M. Global political economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton University Press, 2006)

[1] Ndemo, E.B., (2015). Political Entrepreneurialism: Reflections of a Civil Servant on the Role of Political Institutions in Technology Innovation and Diffusion in Kenya. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 4(1), p.Art. 15. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fd

[2] Ndemo, E.B., (2015). Political Entrepreneurialism: Reflections of a Civil Servant on the Role of Political Institutions in Technology Innovation and Diffusion in Kenya. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 4(1), p.Art. 15. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fd

[3] https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Global_Internet_Report_2014_0.pdf accesed on 21/12/2022

[4] Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN is an internationally. Organized, non-profit corporation tasked with keeping the internet secure, stable and interopable. It promotes competition and develops policy on the internet’s unique identifiers.

[5] https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-launches-african-engagement-office-in-nairobi-26-5-2016-en accessed on 07/12/2022

[6] https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/icann-to-install-two-root-server-clusters-in-kenya-and-one-other-african-country/nxhs1yn accessed on 07/12/2022

[7] https://african.business/2021/07/technology-information/kenya-and-ghana-lead-world-in-mobile-money/ accessed on 10/12/2022

[8] Role of Technology in International Affairs, Amitav Mallik, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Pentagon Press New Delhi 2016 pg 12

[9] Ibid pg 13

[10] Hocking, Brian, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp. 2012. Futures for diplomacy integrative diplomacy in the 21st century.

[11] Lindstrom, G., (2012) Diplomats and Diplomacy for the 21st Century Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

[12] Rana K.S. (2010) Inside Diplomacy New Delhi, Manas Publications

[13] Afman, E. R. and M. Maurel.(2010). Diplomatic relations and trade reorientation in transition countries. In van Bergeijk, P. A. and S. Brakman (eds). The Gravity model in international trade: Advances and applications Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[14] Lindstrom, G., (2012) Diplomats and Diplomacy for the 21st Century Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

[15] Rana K.S. (2011) Bilateral Diplomacy, Geneva, Diplo-handbooks.

[16] https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Digital-Entrepreneurship-in-Kenya-2014.pdf accessed on 11/12/2022

[17] https://kenyabusinessguide.org/2018/11/08/ict-sector-brief-decoding-the-silicon-savannah/ accessed on 11/12/2022

[18] https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kenya-information-communications-and-technologyict#:~:text=The%20country’s%20ICT%20sector%20is,GDP%20through%20IT%2Denabled%20services. accessed on 10/12/2022

[19] https://ict.go.ke/ict-growth-expands-economy-in-kenya/ accessed on 10/12/2022

THE 2022 KENYAN GENERAL ELECTIONS: Social Media, Psychological operations (PSYOP) and the Future Ramifications

The Kenyan 2022 Elections

On August 9th, 2022, Kenyans will once again be heading to the polls to elect their President, National government representatives, and County government representatives. The presidential candidates are four including the major front runners Raila Odinga, former Prime Minister of Kenya (2008–2013) and leader of Orange Democratic Movement/Azimio la Umoja Alliance, William Ruto, current Deputy President of Kenya (2013–present), and leader of United Democratic Alliance. The other two candidates include David Waihiga Mwaure, leader of the Agano Party who is running on a socially conservative, religious, and economic prudent manifesto while George Wajackoyah, leader of Roots Party of Kenya is running on a radical populist manifesto that includes the legalization of bhang/cannabis and snake farming. While Kenyan voters have predictably flocked to rallies by the major front runners in the elections, the other presidential candidates specifically George Wajackoyah and his Roots party, have taken another route focusing their campaigns on social media platforms to gather traction. They have a radical and populist manifesto which seems to have endeared them, especially to the younger generation of voters who have a larger social media presence and whose apathy to voter registration indicated by a low turnout indicates the front runners are not having the impact they wished they would have had with that demographic. Both front runners have actually launched separate ‘youth manifestos’ to remedy this apathy both promising social and economic reforms favoring the youth demographic specifically. Despite this expected strategy from the front runners, it is indeed interesting to note that the other two minor candidates are polar opposites.  David Waihiga Mwaure cuts a clean-cut image, eloquent, Christian conservative, and measured with his words. The party’s image is that of a lamb. The Image of the Lamb is associated with or symbolizes themes of religion, innocence, and morality. Prof George Wajackoyah on the other hand cuts the image of an eloquent, well-educated rebel with revolutionary disregard for the accepted norms in Kenya’s current social, cultural, political, and economic status quo. The Image of a root and slogan of ‘Tingiza Mti’ seems to project a message of rebellion against the status quo which is the tree and going to the roots will destabilize and uproot the tree. So while the status quo can generally be assumed to be the front runners in the elections with their allies most of whom have been in and are in the current government, Kenyans are now faced with an alternative choice away from the status quo. The choice between the Cannabis Rebel and the Christian Conservative.

 

Social Media and Psychological operations (PSYOP)

It is within this context that this article would like to examine the subjects of elections, digital media, and the role of psychological operations in both areas. The context within which this article refers to social media is the interactive digital channels that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and networks.[1] [2]While psychological operations may broadly be defined as the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior, to create target groups, behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national objectives.

Now that we have defined both variables let us examine the context within which they fall in the Kenyan 2022 general elections. Although 22.1 million voters are registered for Kenya’s general polls in August, up from 19.6 million five years ago, only 39.84% of those voters are young people, according to Wafula Chebukati, chairman of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). While the older generation of voters who make up the majority of 60 %, know and identify with the major front runners and their allies we still have a sizeable chunk of 40% of the younger generation notable displaying an apathy to the status quo. IEBC blames the low voter registration figures by the younger generation of voters who are aged between 18-35 years on economic hardships and corruption in the country that has discouraged the youth from engaging in the electoral process. This is not a surprise considering the global economy is experiencing a recession, partly fueled by the Russian-Ukraine conflict, which started just after countries across the world were beginning to recover from the Coronavirus pandemic. Needless to say, the Kenyan economy has also been hit hard with the price of basic foodstuff and fuel rising.

The number of Kenyan voters aged between 18-35 who registered to vote for the August polls dropped by 5.27% compared to 2017. Those who registered we can actively presume are disenchanted with the status quo and are airing their frustrations on social media where they have a huge presence.[3] In Kenya in 2020, mobile phone penetration among adults (30,301,812 people over age 18 in Kenya) was 98%, with 43% of adults using the internet (96% of them on smartphones rather than computers) and 17% using social media (98% of them on smartphones). Thus based on the above figures of registered youth voters who make up roughly 8.8 million voters we can deduce that around 1 million or more of them should be able to access social media accounts in one form or another. It is this segment of voters that is the target of what seems to be Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in digital political campaigns that are becoming a norm on social media platforms in Kenya. It is indeed unique for a sub-Saharan country to resort to psychographic profiling and targeting of its civilian population where regime change is rife with election irregularity and rampant voter tampering on the ground.[4] These activities include deception, coercion, and influence activities from propaganda, persuasion, policy-making, information, and marketing scholarship.  One quick glance daily on the Kenyan social media platforms reveals sponsored political hashtags trending largely due to social media influencers paid by marketing agencies who have in turn been paid by political operatives. In other cases, influential social media personalities directly affiliated with political parties, and even security agencies share misinformation frequently without bothering to verify it first.

 

If you check the Kenyan Twitter accounts that trend political hashtags the characteristic features tend to be the same. The Twitter handles do not bear the owner’s real names, the followers of those Twitter accounts tend to range between 1000 to even 1 million followers, they trend hashtags from all political parties (money is the common denominator), and multiple Twitter accounts are run sometimes by the same individual and most of the owners of these accounts are technologically savvy. The fact that some of these Twitter account holders can be paid from as low as Ksh.1000 (based on Wowzi rates) to trend hashtags to thousands of people makes social media a popular campaign tool, especially for cash-strapped political candidates in the constituency and county level of politics.  We have companies such as Wowzi which is basically an Influencer Platform based in Kenya selling social media reach and influence at a fee. A platform operating similar to other internet platforms such as Air BnB or Uber but in this case, the product is social media marketing and PR.  This is actually quite an innovative idea. The two Kenyan presidential front runners are heavy hitters on social media. William Ruto has 4.8 million followers on Twitter while Raila has 3.6 million followers. They also have close allies who act as their social media influencers/ political allies(cronies) with accounts that have followers of 1 million and above. Of course, we have to factor in that some of their followers are not Kenya citizens thus the real numbers may be lower. But these numbers come with power in the digital space. The ability to influence sentiments, inform and misinform a huge amount of people in just 280 characters, the Twitter character limit. Of course, ever since Josef Goebbels mastered the art of propaganda during world war II, many after him have learned crucial lessons and applied them. Social media has now become the weapon of choice for Kenya politicians when it comes to propaganda and political rhetoric. It is cheap, fast, and effective.

But is there a dark side to Social Media Influencing and PSYOPs? The insight from data mined from such digital political campaigns can be crucial for security services, intelligence agencies, and policymakers when it comes to policy formulation and decision making. Whether they have access to the data is subject to conjecture. However, as the several recent scandals involving, individuals, states, and corporates (Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, NSA, Facebook, and Cambridge Analytica) have shown, it is clear that states will go to any length to protect their national security while corporations will go to any length to protect their profits and revenue streams. Data sets can be analyzed for example in the case of Kenya along, tribal, age, religious, educational level, social beliefs, cultural beliefs, and political affiliation clusters. For context, Psychographic research which emerged in the 1960s, originally to understand consumer (rather than political) behavior, moves beyond the above standard demographics into areas such as personality traits, activities, interests, opinions, needs, values, and attitudes to offer novel insights into large, representative samples of respondents [5]. These data can be gleaned from social media quite easily today. In the past decade psychographic and neuromarketing tools have been combined with data and tracking methods to determine the emotional impact of advertising campaigns, and how to tailor persuasive political messages to profiled audiences’ psychological needs[6]. “Profiling” is defined in the European General Data Protection Regulation as: “any form of automated processing of personal data, to analyze or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behavior, location or movements.[7] This is a goldmine literally in this digital age. For example, a group of youth attending a reggae concert in Nairobi Kenya, and who confirmed attendance via Social Media event platforms could unwittingly be profiled as a target for Kenyan Presidential aspirant George Luchiri Wajackoyah, Roots party, whose goal of legalizing cannabis, a key  component of their manifesto, has been promoted along with reggae songs on the campaign trail.

Conclusion

The future ramifications of a growing Kenyan population that is increasingly acquiring smartphones and creating an online presence on the internet can have positive and negative consequences.  Millennials who demographic researchers put their date of birth between 1981-1996 ushered and saw the transition of a world transforming from analog to digital platforms. Generation Z or Zoomers born between 1997 and 2012 have literally grown up in a world surrounded by digital platforms whereas Generation Alpha born between the early 2010s to 2020 will have literally not known a world without digital platforms. As we look toward the future, data collected from these 3 Kenyan generations will impact all aspects of their life; social, economic, cultural, religious, and political beliefs.  In the context of politics, it will change the nature of how politicians view voters. Any piece of any information will be an added advantage in that cutthroat future. You as the voter will also have a trove of verifiable and non-verifiable information available. In short to make decisions that will impact your future as the voter, you can choose to verify, research, question, and even critically examine what your leaders stand for. Indeed, a future where propaganda and misinformation will be the norm is a possibility. But the same digital future with social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, and Instagram can enable citizens to access free information that they can leverage to positively determine their future. Our politicians will also increasingly find it hard to hide behind anonymity, cheap rhetoric, and false promises (#Theinternetneverforgets idiom). But we can also see a darker future than the above two scenarios. An example is China where only state-sanctioned content can appear on their digital platforms. Whether it be social, political, cultural, or economic platforms all are censored. As long as states have the power of territorial sovereignty, the issue of digital sovereignty is and will always be an option for states around the world including Kenya in the future. But the steps that decide where our journey will end start now and with the policy and regulatory decisions we will make with regard to our digital resources and platforms. Meanwhile, in the coming elections, Kenyans seem to have 3 choices, the Status Quo, the Cannabis Rebel, and the Christian Conservative on the ballot. We await to see their choice.

[1] Kietzmann, Jan H.; Kristopher Hermkens (2011). “Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media”. Business Horizons (Submitted manuscript). 54 (3): 241–25

[2] Obar, Jonathan A.; Wildman, Steve (2015). “Social media definition and the governance challenge: An introduction to the special issue”. Telecommunications Policy

[3] https://www.theafricareport.com/216515/kenya-2022-elections-how-will-the-low-number-of-young-registered-voters-play-out/

[4] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00067/full

[5] Wells, W. D. (1975). Psychographics: a critical review. J. Mark. Res. 12, 196–213. doi: 10.1177/002224377501200210

[6] Chester, J., and Montgomery, K. (2017). The role of digital marketing in political campaigns. Internet Policy Rev. 6:4. doi: 10.14763/2017.4.773

[7] Privacy International (2020). Why We’re Concerned About Profiling and Micro-Targeting in Elections. Available online at: https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3735/why-were-concerned-about-profiling-and-micro-targeting-elections (accessed March 26, 2020).

ETHIOPIA’S GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA MOMENT: The African Information Technology Endeavour

 

 

Keywords: Information Technology, International Economic Affairs, Foreign Policy

 

Introduction

In August 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev holidayed in Nizhniaia Oreanda, Ukraine, where he wrote Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and Our World. This marked the beginning of social and economic reforms in the former Soviet Union, Glasnost (openness), and Perestroika (economic reform), which had a domino effect across a world that was ideologically divided between the Communist east and the Capitalist west during the cold war era. As a result of Gorbachev’s foreign policy decision, the Soviet Union began to retreat from building world communism towards glasnost and perestroika policies, marking a dramatic reduction in aid to Ethiopia from Socialist Bloc countries.  Ironically Ethiopia during the Derg era (1974–1991) suffered several coups, uprisings, and wide-scale drought partly due to this withdrawal of support. Now roughly three decades later Ukraine where Gorbachev wrote his book is at war with Russia. Ethiopia is still experiencing uprisings, this time specifically affecting the Tigray Region of Ethiopia. There have been claims by both sides of serious war crimes including genocide, but this article bearing in mind these difficult issues would like to also examine another important ongoing event in Ethiopia, the liberalization of Ethiopia’s information technology sector, a Glasnost and Perestroika moment. What lessons can Ethiopia and indeed the rest of Africa hope to learn from this endeavor as they maneuver the global information technology revolution that is the hallmark of the 21st century?

 Opening Up: Glasnost

The creation of liberalized economic systems has historically been endorsed and is often aggressively pursued as an international policy agenda for African states by international institutions created by the West and in charge of international trade and finance, such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and OECD. The policies of these organizations are theoretically founded on neo-classical economic presumptions which are an offshoot of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage which in theory promotes economic liberalism. However, in practice, the widespread claim, among economists, that European countries have adhered to economic liberalism and free trade as a strategy for economic growth is not true. It is worth noting that since the 1700s, European states have deliberately enforced protectionist policies through the use of subsidies as well as tariffs and non-tariff barriers in a bid to develop their manufacturing industries and buffer their products from external competition.[1] This is an important point to note because in this case, we have an African state opening up its information technology sector for a company from a neighboring African state. However, do the above vague liberal economic trade policies apply when African states deal with each other as opposed to when they have dealt with European states for example?  The hope is that this should not be the case. There are flaws with economic liberalism in developing states, especially in Africa. Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik argue that studies that show a strong positive correlation between external openness and economic growth in developing countries are based on flawed methodological and empirical choices.[2] Can the reverse be the case if glasnost is applied amongst developing states as is the case between Kenya and Ethiopia with regard to information technology? This is definitely an area that would require more research, especially in this case where technology and transfer of knowledge are what is at stake.

 

The Role of Science and Technology in the Dynamics of Global Change and the Significance of International Knowledge Cooperation

 

Africa has seen countries jumping from old telephone technologies to smartphones within less than a decade. The telecommunication companies have shed the old, maintenance-prone, and capital-intensive communication infrastructures that have now become obsolete. According to data by GSMA at the end of 2020, 495 million people subscribed to mobile services in Sub-Saharan Africa, representing 46% of the region’s population.[3] This combined with Africa’s projected demographic dividend where it will account for 80 percent of the projected 4 billion increase in the global population by 2100 could mean African people with access to smartphones and other nascent technology, and thus to communication- and information networks, have the potential to reshape and impact the global economy.[4]

Technology is driving economic globalization, the first wave of global change. Dirk Messner, former Vice-Rector of the United Nations University (UNU) and Director of the German Development Institute defines the first wave of global change as the globalization wave; which comprises economic globalization, cross-border dynamics, and global value chains. To him, the stability of global commons such as international financial markets and global infrastructures, such as the Internet is a required public good of which regulation exceeds the capacity of individual nation-states. So there is a need especially for states in Africa to work together and understand the dynamics of new technologies, especially the impact of ICTs, in order to understand the dynamics of economic globalization.[5] The World Wide Web and social communication media are also restructuring industrialization processes and global value chains. ICT infrastructure is also displaying a big potential for less developed regions and it is crucial for developing states not to be left behind. This is why the cross-border venture by Safaricom Kenya PLC into Ethiopia can be viewed as a noble endeavor, a catalyst for other potential future ventures by African companies within the African continent. What is also more crucial is that African states need to leverage the free trade agreement, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), with the ultimate goal being to accelerate the economic integration of the continent.

 The Noble Ethiopian Experiment

Ethiopia has a population estimated at over 112 million as of 2021, which is forecasted to grow up to 160 million by the year 2035. The liberalization of Ethiopia’s telecommunications with the entry of Safaricom Telecommunications Ethiopia P.L.C which is expected to roll out services from 2022 marks a major turning point for the country, east Africa, and indeed Africa. What is unique is that Ethiopia has opened up its telecommunication sector to a consortium of companies, whose majority stake is owned by a Kenyan telecommunications company Safaricom.

Shareholding of Safaricom Telecommunications Ethiopia P.L.C. (STE),

Rank Name of Owner Country Percentage Ownership
1 Safaricom Kenya 55.70
2 Sumitomo Japan 27.20
3 CDC Group UK 10.90
4 Vodacom South Africa 6.20
Total 100

It is indeed a noble endeavor to see an African technological company investing heavily in another African country. This venture does bring the economic ties between Ethiopia and Kenya much closer. We have also seen the intervention from a foreign policy perspective with the heads of states from both countries deeply involved in the process. However with a population of over 100 million people and what is considered a virgin telecommunications sector even for a company of the magnitude of Safaricom Kenya PLC, initial financial investment and skilled technical expertise beyond the African continent will be needed. The consortium offering this support is composed of companies from South Africa, Japan, and the UK. This can be viewed as an advantage for Ethiopia even though it has taken a while to open up its telecommunications sector.  It can, for example, leverage the lessons learned from Kenya, which through the M-PESA mobile money service launched by Safaricom in 2007 has revolutionized the information technology sector not only in East Africa but Africa and the world. The economic impact M-PESA has had in Kenya for the last 15 years cannot be understated. According to the latest financial results released by Safaricom in April 2022 Kenyans transacted 29. 5 trillion shillings in the M-PESA ecosystem. This translates to 250 billion US dollars. Considering Ethiopia has an untapped or virgin mobile money ecosystem and more than twice Kenya’s population it is safe to assume that if M-PESA’s success is replicated in Ethiopia there will be a huge economic transformation.  There is already a scramble for this market with Huawei the Chinese technology company reducing its footprint in neighboring Kenya to focus on Ethiopia which has virtually no 4G or Fibre network and infrastructure in place. There is hope that this investment can be a much-needed example of what potential intra-African trade can have in the 21st century. In addition, Safaricom Kenya PLC’s multivendor strategy which pitted Huawei China, Finnish rival Nokia, and rival US tech companies all bidding for their 5G rollout tenders may also mean that Safaricom Ethiopia PLC can leverage their virgin network to the best bid available.[6]

Conclusion

The future is bright. In February 2022 a group of only Kenyan telecoms engineers made the first technical call on Safaricom Telecommunications Ethiopia P.L.C’s network. There is also a deliberate effort to employ Ethiopian employees, onboard Ethiopian suppliers, agents, and vendors from the onset, and facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skilled expertise between Kenyan and Ethiopian employees. For me personally, this is an example of the solidarity of our Pan-Africanists’ forefathers  Toussaint LouvertureJean-Jacques DessalinesHaile SelassieJulius NyerereRobert SobukweAhmed Sékou TouréKwame Nkrumah and many more envisioned. However, there is still a long way to go. African technological companies still do not have the capacity to fully run a technological company without assistance from American, Asian & European expertise, investment, and intellectual property. The lack of enough skilled tech labor and insufficient transfer of knowledge from the global north to the global south is a hindrance.

 

It is also a fact that the distribution of scientific and technological capabilities is extremely polarized across the globe. This means that the net recipients of Intellectual Property Rights royalties and fees are based in the global North and the net payers are based in the global South. Companies like Safaricom pay huge amounts for software licenses and maintenance fees for cloud services where they store their data. The advocates of Intellectual Property Rights argue that Southern countries with a strong regime of Intellectual Property Rights will benefit from greater inflows of technology transfer.[7] However, the fact on the ground is that access to advanced technology is restricted. American, Asian & European companies and the states from where their head offices are based consider this knowledge crucial to their national interests and thus it will not be shared easily. Companies in the global North may be reluctant to establish production facilities, build R&D labs, license know-how, and engage in strategic technology agreements in countries that do not properly guarantee Intellectual Property Rights[8] . But in Kenya where there is a robust Intellectual Property Rights regime in place, there seems to be no goodwill in terms of this investment required above. There is hope this will change. Microsoft, Amazon, and Google have set up residence in Kenya to tap into the growing availability of skilled labor, available IT infrastructure, and enabling investment environment facilitated by the Kenyan government. These companies also know that Kenya is at the vanguard of the technological renaissance in Africa, as the investment in Ethiopia has highlighted. It will be in the interest of Kenya, Ethiopia, and indeed the rest of Africa to utilize these arising opportunities.

 By Tuesday Orina Masaki 

Phd Candidate, International Studies

University of Nairobi

 

[1] Murithi, T. (2014). Handbook of Africa’s international relations.pg 317

[2] Rodriguez, F., & Rodrik, D. (1999). Trade policy and economic growth: A skeptic’s guide to the cross-national evidence. London: CEPR.

[3] https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/sub-saharan-africa/#:~:text=By%20the%20end%20of%202020,almost%2020%20million%20on%202019.

[4] Drummond, P. F. N., Thakoor, V., Yu, S., & International Monetary Fund. (2014). Africa rising: Harnessing the demographic dividend. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

[5] The Global Politics of Science & Technology Volumes 1 & 2 by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, Ruth Knoblich (eds) Heidelberg: Springer,  -Vol. 1  The Role of Science and Technology in the Dynamics of Global Change and the Significance of International Knowledge Cooperation in the Post-WesternWorld: An Interview with Dirk Messner

[6] Mureithi, Carlos. “Kenya becomes the second African country to roll out 5G.” Quartz Africa, April 2021.

[7] The Global Politics of Science & Technology Volumes 1 & 2 by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, Ruth Knoblich (eds) Heidelberg: Springer,  -Vol. 1  The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights: Much Ado About Nothing pg 162

[8] Ibid

 

 

 

Innovation and Global Power

 

Introduction

This paper is about how innovation has influenced the power of states in global politics. Indeed when innovation is mapped across history a notable trend is that states which have been able to gain global preeminence or hegemony have had innovations ahead of others in terms of industrialization, military and economic growth. A case in point is a number of global powers that have at a time ascended to the position of being a leading regional or world power because of being ahead in innovations. For instance the Roman Empire, Egypt, Britain, USA and contemporary China all have a history of cutting edge innovations in science and technology which propelled them to the realm of global powers. The thesis of this paper is that innovation contributes to a state’s power in global politics. This paper seeks to interrogate some of the narratives and nuances about the relationship between innovations and projection of a state’s power globally. For instance has innovation been a positive or negative phenomenon in international politics? What has been driving innovation? Is it quest for power or human survival or bettering the standard of life for human beings? In what ways has innovation influenced states’ pursuit, accumulation and projection of power? Can power undermine innovation? To explore answers to these questions, the paper is structured in three broad themes. First is operationalization of key terms namely, innovation and power; then second is an assessment of the link between innovation and global power, which involves a review of cases and scholarly debates; and finally is the conclusion encompassing a critical view about the subject of the paper.

Operationalization of terms

Independently, the term innovation has thousands of definitions. Generally as an English word, the Oxford dictionary defines innovation as “make changes in something established, especially by introducing new methods, ideas, or products.”[1] Similarly, the Cambridge dictionary defines innovation as “a new idea or method or the use of new ideas and methods.”[2]  But perhaps the definition by Webster is more apt where it defines innovation as a “new idea, creative thoughts, new imaginations in form of device or method”[3]This definition is more comprehensive because it looks at innovation as including both the idea and the technology or what it refers to as the ‘device’. Accordingly this paper views innovation as the application of creative or better ideas and technology to provide solutions that meet needs of a state or society.

Scholarly literature is also replete with various definitions of innovation. For instance, Frankelius defines innovation as “something original and more effective…”[4] while Bhasin for instance, in defining innovation, endeavours to distinguish it from invention. Bhasin suggests that “innovation is related to, but not the same as invention, arguing that invention is the creation or introduction of something for the first time, while innovation is improving or making significant contribution to something that has already been invented.”[5]  As such, “innovation is more apt to involve the practical implementation of an invention to make a meaningful impact and not all innovations require an invention.[6] Just to note, in commerce opposite of innovation is exnovation; a term developed by John Kimberly and Sandeep.

Generally, most definitions of innovation focus on business or corporate sector as well as science and technology. The political element of innovation has received limited attention in literature. Indeed most literature treats science and technology and innovation as related but independent concepts. Organizations such as USAID, WB and Kenya’s NACOSTI (national commission for Science, Technology and Innovation) talk of science, technology and innovation as a concept or a theme. STI are viewed mainly as drivers of economic and social development.

In international relations or politics military innovations led to the international security phenomenon of security dilemma. That is an arms race between global powers, especially during the Cold War period on who is more innovative to come up with the best military weapons?

Indeed innovation in IR has been linked to power capabilities globally not only through military prowess but also diplomatic or foreign policy tactics such as propaganda or employment of innovative ways in manipulating large audiences. For instance Karl Deustch observes that states overestimate the immediate military value and power of a single technological innovation as a way of showing their power globally[7].  He further states that governments tend to claim specific national and ideological credit for technological innovations which might have originated from foreign countries. For example, he reveals that most American school children do not know that an automobile was originated by a German and Penicillin by an Englishman.[8]   Generally a key diplomatic way of demonstrating power is to overestimate a state’s inventiveness and ability to innovate, hence national technological and scientific power while at the same time understating the innovations and scientific and technological power of other states.[9]

It is also argued that developed nations have used their power globally to undermine or even suppress innovation in other states. For instance scholars and scientists have engaged in the so called politics of knowledge production to give a blackout to innovations from certain parts of the world and highlight innovations from global powers. For example, since 1950’s American scientists and scholars have developed a trend of citing on average about three American sources for every one foreign source.[10]  And this is the trend for journals published in English or other powerful states like China.

Drivers of innovation

Certain factors have informed the progress of innovation. Among them is the need for human survival or ‘making life possible’ for human beings such as invention of fire, agrarian revolution, the traditional irrigation and other ancient agricultural practices in northern Ethiopia (Tigray) since 500 B.C.[11] , the need for security led to innovations like the Assegai spear of Shaka Zulu, the gun powder and modern war weapons, industrialization and general innovation for the sake of power politics.

Historically, theoretically various scholars have different explanations for drivers of innovation and ultimate power of a state. For instance, to realists the power and primacy of Britain in the C19, especially naval and commercial superiority was based on its leading role in industrialization, while Gramcians and Marxists emphasized that Britain’s power was due to innovations driven by the growth of a capitalist world led to a new form of international politics that emphasized innovations so to compete in the world market.[12] This saw innovations in currency exchanges, transport and shipping; factors that made some states to wield more power globally, for example, Britain and USA.

Notably, competition globally or among sectors has driven innovation yet this competition has also undermined innovation. For instance, innovation in one sector or part of the world may threaten power or entrenched status in other parts thus attracting resistance or counter-innovation. It is argued that innovation which threatens to disrupt the deeply entrenched status and power of professions is very likely to meet with strong resistance.[13] Common examples include resistance of Trade Unions against use of robots and innovative technology that threatens to replace human employment.

The Concept of Power

It is often argued that it is easier to experience than to define or measure power for, in as much as the subject of power has been an interest of social scientists and philosophers for many centuries, there are still notable academic debates its definition. The Cambridge Dictionary defines power as ‘the ability to control people and events.’[14] Robert Dahl, a prominent political analyst, looks at power as the ability to get others do what they otherwise would not do.[15] Hans Morgenthau seems to be in agreement with Dahl as he asserts that power, in the context of international politics, does not refer to man’s control over nature, over self (as in self-control) or over an artistic medium such as sound, speech, colour or language. To him, power refers to man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. He further views international politics as a constant struggle for power and suggests that military strength in actuality or potentiality is the most vital determinant of the political power of a nation.

Joseph Nye defines power as the ability to effect the outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others. He adds that this can be achieved either by coercing through use of threats, inducing through use of payments, or by attracting and co-opting of the targeted group.[16] Nye thus categorized Power as either ‘Hard’ or ‘Soft’ and explains that military and economic power are but examples of hard command power that can be used to get others to change their position. Hard power, he argues, is based on threats (otherwise referred to as sticks) and inducements (also referred to as carrots). Conversely, he proceeds to explain, ‘soft power is anchored on the ability to establish preferences based on intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.’[17] Soft Power this lies in the ability to get the outcomes one wants by attracting others rather than manipulating their material incentives. It co-opts people rather than coerces them.[18]

It is evident that soft power cannot be the best path to take with regard to all political situations.  While some foreign policy objectives are better attained by employing soft power strategies, others may demand hard power tactics or even, the delicate application of both soft and hard power strategies. This brings about the third concept of power known as Smart Power. As expounded by Joseph Nye, this is the balance and effective mixture of soft and hard power skills.[19]  Mandip Singh therefore defines smart power as the capacity of an actor, entity or a nation to effectively combine the elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing or mutually complementary so as to achieve the desired aim effectively.[20]

A most recent conceptualization of power has been in the form of Sharp Power. Christopher Walker in his article titled, What is Sharp Power? defines it as a tactic to international affairs that includes efforts at censorship, or the use of manipulation to water down the integrity of independent institutions. The term ‘sharp’ depicts it ability and objective to “pierce, penetrate, or perforate” the political and information environments of particular societies. [21] Sharp power primarily targets crucial societal sectors such as culture, academia, media, and publishing for the purpose of influencing the perceptions of the targeted audiences and their comprehension of their environment.

In this regard, and having conceptualized power and innovation, the paper embarks on demonstrating the intricate but important relationship between power and innovation.

Power and Innovation

The significance of innovation in international politics is self-evident. Societies that are able to effectively harness and manage the new capacities brought about by innovations and technological advancements are conferred with considerable advantage over those that lack such ability. This is because revolutionary innovations have had an outstanding influence on the economic and political progress and human conditions of different peoples due to their varied applications in war, commerce, energy, agriculture, diplomacy, medicine, intelligence, security, finance, food and water supply, health, weaponry, among others.[22] Consequently, the capability of a military to innovate so as to adequately neutralize the threats of its time influences the state‘s capacity to maintain great power status.

Furthermore, an examination of the resource sector reveals that investments in commodities or assets results in returns that are normally diminishing. On the contrary, investments in innovation have the capacity to produce sustainable and scalable returns.[23] As such, innovation presents, especially for a continent such as Africa, the opportunities for sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Indeed, the future, and particularly ‘Africa’s future is dependent on minds and not on mines.’ [24]

The search for power, in the military sense, has been evidenced by the ever continuous efforts at improving available weaponry.  Weapons can be said to be special devices, arguably artifacts of the greatest significance in Man’s history, designed to achieve the primary objective of pursuing and retaining power, as realists would have it. Certainly, the affiliation between man and his weaponries is very profound.[25]

Military innovation can be defined as the adaptation of militaristic inventions to the organization, doctrine and strategy of the military for the purpose of maximizing the use of the inventions. For lethal, far-reaching and sustainable results, the innovations may include the incorporation of soft and sharp power too. As inventions, adversaries can easily imitate and use the same against the inventors, but as innovations, the technology and tactics will aligned to their way of life, drawing from their unique strengths and reducing their equally unique shortcomings hence making it difficult to imitate.[26]

Innovation is therefore more of an evolutionary process than a one-time event. For instance, the accounts regarding the use of the horse in combat is divided into three phases: The first phase was that of the charioteer, followed by that of the mounted warrior who hang to his horse by pressure of the knees. The last phase is that of the rider equipped with stirrups to improve on the horseman’s stability.  Thus each improvement in the military use of the horse has rendered the horseman more lethal. [27]

Finally, it is important to note that, for purposes of pursuit of power, states in the post-World War II age were largely preoccupied with weapon technology and adoption of science and technology in national security strategies.[28] Presently, the possession of nuclear weapons and capabilities, as illustrated recently by North Korea, significantly raises the coercive bargaining power of states thus becoming the symbolic criterion to great power status.[29] Despite its relatively weak economy, North Korea’s advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities have made it a focus-point for the US and the United Nations Security Council. It is presently engaged with the US, a superpower, in a series of negotiations in what is termed as nuclear diplomacy.

The paper will now embark on a case study approach, drawing lessons mainly from the ancient period in history with the purpose of highlighting how innovation has been a significant factor in determining the rise and fall of renowned powers. This period was unique in history since it is, by and large, regarded as the moment when the first concepts of power and warfare came into being. For the purposes of either survival, enhancement of livelihoods or pursuit of power, civilizations made innovations in technological, doctrinal and organizational realms. For instance, with regard to the organizational realm there was a move towards establishment of standing armies while doctrinally there were continued efforts at professionalizing the militaries.[30]

Egypt (3100 BC–1069 BC)

Egypt was one of the first and greatest civilization to have ever been. It existed for more than 2000 years. To what extent did innovation in technology, doctrines and organization contribute to its rise and dominance?

With regard to hard power, it is important to note that encounters between various cultures and civilizations during this period were often marked by conflict.  The military profession in Egypt was therefore highly rated, not only among the nobles, but across all classes. In addition, each member of the military was accorded eight acres of land by the Pharaoh. Egypt prided in the existence of special military schools where extensive military training was conducted even as from childhood.[31] This doctrinal and organizational innovation of ensuring a standing army and professionalizing it ensured that the Egyptians were always ready to defend their interests. The same doctrinal and organizational advantage contributed immensely to the rise and maintenance of power by the Roman Empire more than a millennium later.[32]

The technological innovation of chariots and its consequent application in war in equal measure was a critical determinant of Egypt’s military power. Bothwell Gosse illustrates that the chariot ordinarily contained the charioteer (the driver), one or two warriors and various weapons at their disposal. However, the archers, having the reins of the horses round their waists, were skillful enough to operate their bows and arrows while controlling the movement of the horses using their voices.[33]

Apart from militaristic capabilities, ancient Egypt also attributed much of its power to significant innovations in art, trade, writing, and construction that made it a remarkable and exceptional civilization. The dazzling cultural achievements of ancient Egypt, its breathtaking opulence and artistic patronage generally made it attractive to the outside world. The pyramids at Giza are, for example, the sole surviving wonder of the ancient world and have been variously described as an extraordinary product of superhuman authority. [34]

With all this attractiveness and its strategic geopolitical location, Egypt became a melting pot of peoples and cultures. The area also received immigrants who were escaping harsher arid conditions from their homelands. As such, successive waves of immigrants enriched and renewed Egyptian civilization in terms of industry, technology and customs.[35]In this manner, Egypt aptly made use of technological, doctrinal and organizational innovations to enhance its hard and soft power alike.

Egypt’s ascendancy to power was, by and large, anchored on agriculture. Their mastery of nature, in terms of their immediate environment, contributed to creation of innovative ways of subduing their environment to their advantage. The invention of the wheel, for instance, helped in transportation of farm inputs and produce; the plough helped in tilling of the land while the shadoof and canal irrigation methods ensured steady supply of water to their farms.

Lastly, and certainly not the least, sharp power in Egypt was attained through the use of the pen, the sculptor’s knife and word of mouth to extend the notion of preeminence of Egyptian’s way of life. Egyptians (just like Americans today) had a natural superiority complex, regarding themselves as uniquely blessed and a civilization apart. They advanced this notion of greatness and superiority in their literature, architecture and works of art. Egyptian rulers, for example, conveniently applied the idea of deific kingship and constructed monumental architecture to exhibit and retain power.

 

 

The Assyrians (934 BC–605 BC)

The history of Assyria has otherwise been described as the history of war for they were under constant attack and were also regarded as a barbaric, warring and tyrannical people. Assyria glorified military strength and by use of its state-of-the-art weaponry managed to conquer territories and become, at one point, the greatest power in Southwest Asia. After they clutched control of Egypt, for instance, the Assyrian king is known to have declared, “I tore up the root of Kush, and not one therein escaped to submit to me.”[36]

 

Apart from technological innovation, the Assyrians also displayed superiority in organizational innovation. Early and well laid out strategies executed with dexterity allowed the Assyrians to bring enemy cities under their control.  They sought to weaken city walls before attacking cities by digging beneath them. The infantry advanced towards the city walls and volleyed wave upon wave of arrows while others struck the city’s gates with huge, iron-tipped battering rams. For cities surrounded with water, as a defensive mechanism, the Assyrian engineers spanned the rivers with pontoons, or floating structures used to support a bridge.[37]

Administratively, the Assyrian leaders came up with a parallel system that expedited taxation of their subjects for the sole purpose of supporting the army. This consequently translated into enhancement of military capabilities. Similarly, it is said that it is the Assyrians who came up with the model of military rank in the army for purposes of clearly delineating who should lead and who should follow.[38]

For purposes of facilitating the use armored cavalry, two non-military, technological innovations took place. To begin with, they sought to breed horses that would be huge and strong enough to support an armored rider. Secondly, they commenced cultivating the alfalfa forage crop solely for the horses.  This marked the first time that crops were cultivated exclusively as forage and did not contest with the crops grown for human consumption[39]

In this manner, the Assyrian militarily innovated in all three realms—organization, doctrine, and technology—to sustain an empire for over seven centuries, despite being mistrusted by its neighbors and being under constant attack.

The paradox in the Assyrian case is that while this great power first consciously merged social and military innovation in a symbiotic cycle, it was unable to create the soft power capability to sustain its civilization. Technological innovations in society, such as larger horse breeding, alfalfa cultivation, and taxation directly supported the military power of the empire, but did not translate to creating a society that others wanted to emulate.[40] Furthermore, the ruthlessness with which it treated its conquered territories earned it enemies from all over. Unlike Egypt, therefore, Assyria failed to employ innovative technology in pursuing soft, smart and sharp power. This eventually led to is decline and destruction.

The Greeks (776 BC–323 BC)

Early Greece may be regarded as a small scale representation of the ancient period as a whole. In the 5th Century B.C, the area was dominated by two main powers: Athens which embraced the democratic system of governance and Sparta which was largely an oligarchy By virtue of this region comprising of sea-fairing states, it is argued that the most incredible innovation of this period was the invention and effective use of the warships known as the triremes for conquering adversaries.

Athens and Sparta highly contrasted in the way of life just as Egypt and Assyria. Athens is regarded as the commencement of western civilization, its culture associated with the rise of a democratic culture and the blossoming of art and literature. The Athenian military‘s, just as the Egyptian’s, main role was the preservation and protection of the civilization. It also sought to expand its soft power influence. Conversely, the Spartans, just as the Assyrians, were more of a martial people; military power was for them was not a means but an end in itself. In fact, the Spartan and male children were bred specially for war.[41]

The Peloponnesian Wars of 431–404 B.C.E. (an ancient Greek military conflict, fought by Athens and its empire against the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta) resulted in Sparta briefly taking power, but the soft power of Athenian ideas persisted through the time of Alexander the Great, and beyond.

As a consequence of the available democratic space in Athens and since the Athenians glorified the search for knowledge (emphasis was put on the study of subjects such as history, philosophy, and science), Athens blossomed of new, innovative and significant ideas. Life for the citizens of Sparta was rigid; their devotion to creation of a military state left little time, and space, for the arts or literature.[42] However, the territories conquered by Sparta, such as Messenia, found the regime under the Spartans so oppressive that they launched frequent revolts, thereby weakening the empire.[43] It seems Sparta lacked proper appreciation of the significance soft power techniques for pursuit and maintenance of power.

Lastly, the history of Greece is incomplete without mentioning Alexander the Great of Macedonia. He is considered to be one of the greatest military leaders that the world has ever known for, at a young age of 33, he had created an empire that covered the entire eastern Mediterranean world.[44] Alexander managed to fuse his political shrewdness with a military instinct for quick and proper decisions. It is said that of all the leaders of his times, Alexander understood very well that military power was only but one component of the state. In battle he only sought to conquer territories but not to revenge, completely destroy or subject the conquered to torture and misery. He therefore co-opted the territories he conquered, an innovative strategy which allowed him to create the largest empire in history.

Lessons from this period

Some of the most militarily innovative civilizations established the most powerful empires, like the Assyrians and the Spartans. However, the record of history is written by civilizations that possessed the social influence and strategic coherence to persist through time. The ancient powers that successfully coupled military innovations with the administrative mechanisms to support them were successful in extending their power. Egypt, as the first ‘great power,’ was able to couple soft power with hard power innovations—the chariot and the doctrinal and organizational innovations that maximized it use—to maintain power preeminence.

Conclusion

One factor that continues to influence IR is innovation as reflected in the growing field of science and technology in international politics. Altogether, emerging from the discussions in this paper, innovation has a strong link with global power. Evidently, states that are not just innovative but often ahead of others in this aspect have been identified to possess relative power capabilities in international relations.

A historical assessment of global powers reveals that states that ascended to global power leadership were also ahead in terms of innovation in science and technology at the relevant period in time. From Egypt with its innovations in science and technology mainly in medicine, mathematics, irrigation, use of ox-drawn plough; to Roman Empire with its concrete, calendar, road and bridge engineering and military innovations; Britain with its innovations in naval and industrialization to America’s modern innovations in military and economics.

Indeed as discussed earlier in this paper, not all innovations require an invention,[45] though innovation is related to, but not the same as invention, since innovation may improve or contribute to an invention.[46] In this way, innovation has often involved powers rising on the science, technology and innovation of other states. For instance a clear trend is evident where historically the Greeks rose on the innovations of Egypt and overtook Egypt in terms of global power, and same happened with Romans rising on the innovation of Greeks and later the English learning from the Romans whom they overtook, and the Germans and later Americans gaining their global power leadership by learning from the British. Today, China is emerging as a global power by hinging on the innovations the USA.

As a policy recommendation, this paper suggests that states, especially developing ones, need not compete to invent or ‘re-invent the wheel’ to gain global power, nor should they wait to replicate innovations in science and technology from other states, instead they need be innovative enough to utilize for the innovations in science and technology of leading powers to suit their own needs and context.

 

REFERENCES

Ancient Civilization, ‘Ancient Greece.’ http://www.ushistory.org/civ/5a.asp

Benjamin A. Taylor, ‘Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons For America.’ Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science In Defense Analysis From the Naval Postgraduate School. June 2011

Bhasin, Kim (2 April 2012). “This Is The Difference Between ‘Invention’ And ‘Innovation'”. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-the-difference-between-invention-and-innovation-2012-4?IR=T accessed 05/05/2019

 

Bothwell Gosse, The Civilization of The Ancient Egyptians, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1915)

Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/power (Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/innovation, Accessed, 06/05/2019)

 

Charles Weiss, ‘How Do Science and Technology Affect International Affairs?’ Springer Science, 19 November 2015. 416.

Christopher Walker, ‘What Is Sharp Power?’ Journal of Democracy. Volume 29, Number 3. July 2018.

Deutsch, Karl W. “The Impact of Science and Technology on International Politics.” Daedalus 88, no. 4 (1959): 669-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20026535.

Drazin, R. “Professionals and innovation: Structural- functional versus radical structural perspectives.”  Journal of Management Studies, 1990, 27(3).

Frankelius, Per (2009). “Questioning two myths in innovation literature”. The Journal of High Technology Management Research. 20: 40–51. doi:10.1016/j.hitech.2009.02.002.

Gill S and Mittleman J, Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

Habtu, S. & Yoshinobu, K. J. “Traditional irrigation management in Betmera-Hiwane, Ethiopia: The main peculiarities for the persistence of irrigation practices” Journal of Mountain Science, (2006) 3: 139. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11629-006-0139-0 (accessed 06/05/2019)

Innovation as a New Driver of Growth in Africa Summary of discussions: Deloitte breakfast at the World Economic Forum on Africa Kigali, May 2016

“Innovation”. Merriam-webster.com. Merriam-Webster.  Accessed 6/05/2019

Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Powers to Lead, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, (New York: Routledge, 2004)

Mandip Singh, ‘From Smart Power to Sharp Power: How China Promotes her National Interests,’’ Journal of Defence Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018,

Marshall Cavendish, Ancient Greece: An Illustrated History. (New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2011).

Mayer, M, Carpes, M and Knoblich, R, The Global Politics of Science and Technology – Vol. 1 (New York: Springer Heidelberg, 2014).

O’Connell Robert, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)

Oxford Learners’ Dictionary,

The Assyrian Empire, http://www.sps186.org/downloads/basic/727162/ch4_2.pdf(Available at: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/innovation, accessed 05/05/2019)

Toby Wilkinson, The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt, (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2010).

“What’s the Difference Between Invention and Innovation?”. Forbes. 10 September 2015.

White, L. Townsend, Medieval Technology and Social Change, (California: Clarendon Press, 1962)

 

[1] Oxford Learners’ Dictionary, ( Available at: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/innovation, accessed 05/05/2019)

[2] Cambridge Dictionary ( Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/innovation, Accessed, 06/05/2019)

[3]“Innovation”. Merriam-webster.com. Merriam-Webster.  Accessed 6/05/2019

[4] Frankelius, Per (2009). “Questioning two myths in innovation literature”. The Journal of High Technology Management Research. 20: 40–51. doi:10.1016/j.hitech.2009.02.002.

[5] Bhasin, Kim (2 April 2012). “This Is The Difference Between ‘Invention’ And ‘Innovation'”. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-the-difference-between-invention-and-innovation-2012-4?IR=T accessed 05/05/2019

[6] “What’s the Difference Between Invention and Innovation?”. Forbes. 10 September 2015.

[7] Deutsch, Karl W. “The Impact of Science and Technology on International Politics.” Daedalus 88, no. 4 (1959): 669-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20026535. Pp.670-672

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid. p. 670

[10] Ibid

[11] Habtu, S. & Yoshinobu, K. J. “Traditional irrigation management in Betmera-Hiwane, Ethiopia: The main peculiarities for the persistence of irrigation practices” Journal of Mountain Science, (2006) 3: 139. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11629-006-0139-0 (accessed 06/05/2019)

[12] Gill S and Mittleman J, Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

[13] Drazin, R. “Professionals and innovation: Structural- functional versus radical structural perspectives.”  Journal of Management Studies, 1990, 27(3), 245 – 263.

[14] Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/power

[15] Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 53.

[16] Joseph S. Nye Jr,  The Powers to Lead, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 27

[17] Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, (New York: Routledge, 2004)

[18] Opcit

[19] Ibid,  29.

[20] Mandip Singh, ‘From Smart Power to Sharp Power: How China Promotes her National Interests,’’ Journal of Defence Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018,

[21] Christopher Walker, ‘What Is Sharp Power?’ Journal of Democracy. Volume 29, Number 3. July 2018.

 

[22] Mayer, M, Carpes, M and Knoblich, R, The Global Politics of Science and Technology – Vol. 1 (New York: Springer Heidelberg, 2014), 4.

[23] Innovation as a New Driver of Growth in Africa Summary of discussions: Deloitte breakfast at the World Economic Forum on Africa Kigali, May 2016

[24] Ibid

[25] O’Connell Robert, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)

[26] Benjamin A. Taylor, ‘Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons For America.’ Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science In Defense Analysis

From the Naval Postgraduate School. June 2011

[27] White, L. Townsend,  Medieval Technology and Social Change, (California: Clarendon Press, 1962)

[28]Mayer, M, Carpes, M and Knoblich, R, The Global Politics of Science and TechnologyVol. 1 (New York: Springer Heidelberg, 2014), 39

[29] Charles Weiss, ‘How Do Science and Technology Affect International Affairs?’ Springer Science.

19 November 2015. 416.

[30] Benjamin A. Taylor, ‘Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons For America.’ Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science In Defense Analysis

from The Naval Postgraduate School. June 2011

[31] Bothwell Gosse, The Civilization of The Ancient Egyptians, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1915), 23

[32] Opcit

[33] Ibid, 24

[34] Toby Wilkinson, The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt, (New York :The Random House Publishing Group, 2010), 85

[35] Ibid, 174

[36] The Assyrian Empire, http://www.sps186.org/downloads/basic/727162/ch4_2.pdf

[37] Ibid

[38] Benjamin A. Taylor, ‘Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons For America.’ Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science In Defense Analysis

from The Naval Postgraduate School. June 2011

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid

[42] Ancient Civilization, ‘Ancient Greece.’ http://www.ushistory.org/civ/5a.asp

[43] Marshall Cavendish , Ancient Greece: An Illustrated History. (New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2011), 52

[44] Ibid

[45] “What’s the Difference Between Invention and Innovation?”. Forbes. 10 September 2015.

[46] Bhasin, Kim (2 April 2012). “This Is The Difference Between ‘Invention’ And ‘Innovation'”. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-the-difference-between-invention-and-innovation-2012-4?IR=T accessed

The Emerging Role of Transnational Non-state actors in E-Governance and Cyber Security

 

Abstract

The late 20th century and the start of the 21st century have ushered in what is generally regarded as the digital revolution. The digital age was preceded by what is referred to as the industrial revolution during which two world wars have been fought. During this era states were indeed the dominant actors in International relations. However, this paper examines the emerging role of transnational non-state actors in the expanding cyber dimension of the digital age. The conceptual framework argues that due to the diffusion of power in the cyber space dimension transnational non-state actors are filling the gap in issues that are beyond the scope of state actors. The theoretical framework will use main stream IR theories to examine the increasing relevance of non-state actors in International Relations. The paper argues that since state actors are not willing to cede control of power a mutual comprise may be prudent to addressing the challenges of the digital age. On the normative aspects the paper will examine the role on transnational non-state actors in setting up the rules, regulations and standards that define and control cyberspace dimension. It will also examine how the interdependence of state and non-state actors is mutually beneficial. The empirical analysis will examine using case studies the role of transnational non-state actors in e-governance and cybersecurity issues. The case studies will clearly highlight the role non-state actors have that are out of the scope of state actors. The paper concludes with the recommendation that state actors need to collaborate with transnational non-state actors to address the challenges of e-governance and cyber security. This collaboration in the digital age may be key for any claim to legitimacy in an abstract, undefined cyberspace dimension where power is diffused.

 

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of power in the digital age have since changed and is transitioning from a physical or material space to a virtual space. The intangible virtual environment has presented a paradoxical situation where the major state powers of the world have found themselves vulnerable to attacks by insignificant non-state actors in war or conflict that is asymmetrical in nature.  Various global security issues have arisen as a consequence, for example, cybersecurity. For example social media platforms have the capacity to live stream videos to billions of people. However, the problem with this is that there is no algorithm sophisticated enough to detect violence — or anything else that is illegal — in live streaming videos.  Thus there are substantial policy gaps in the area of e-governance where the global governance capacity of states and non-state actors are limited.

Non-state actors have come up with policies that govern issues especially if they are transnational in nature. In emphasizing the emerging role of transnational non-state actors in the digital era, Nye[1] explains that the spread of information means that power is now more widely distributed and informal networks will undermine the monopoly of states. The challenge states have now is the inability to dominate and control issues around e-governance and cyber security due to the abstract nature of the cyber dimension.

Krasner posits[2] that states have relinquished control over issues they cannot control. These issues are also what coincidentally are forming the global agenda. In the cyberspace dimension, no state can claim dominance. However, states with enhanced capacities still push their agenda especially when national interest is at stake. Robert Keohane andJoseph Nye[3] were among the first scholars to observe the need for rules to govern the cyberspace. This they argued was to not only protect users against cybercrime but also to ensure intellectual property rights are respected.

This paper will examine these two different school of thoughts with regard to who among state or non-state actors plays the major role in issue around e-governance and cybersecurity.

 

 

2.0 CONCEPTUAL    ANALYSIS

2.1 E-GOVERNANCE

Fukuyama[4] defines governance as a government’s ability to deliver services, to make and enforce rules, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.   The concept of “governance” is not new. It is as old as human civilization. In other words governance means the process of decision-making and the process through which decisions are implemented or not implemented[5].  Dawes[6] builds on this definition by positing that e-governance incorporates the use of information and communication technologies to support public services, government administration, democratic processes and relationships among citizens, civil society, the private sector and the state. Governments indeed are important actors in e-governance. However this paper focuses on the emerging role of non-state actors in the context of e-governance defined above.

 

2.2 CYBER SECURITY

Oxford dictionary defines Cyber security as the state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this.[7]The international telecommunications union provides a more detailed definition. ITU defines Cybersecurity as the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can beused to protect the cyber space environment, the organizations and users within the same dimension[8] Cyberspace as a phenomenon has brought a new dimension to international relations (IR). The potential for cyberspace conflicts to posing threats to national security post the development of nuclear weapons in the 1940s was first pointed by Cobb in 1999. Governments are highly concerned with the protection of cyberspace. Cyberspace has been cited as the fifth domain of warfare after land, sea, air and space.[9]

 

2.3 TRANSNATIONAL NON-STATE ACTORS

 

Keohane and Nye explained transnational actors as the actors interacting across state boundaries where at least one non-state agent is party to the relations. Transnational relations they posited, were unique in that they represented “contacts, collaborations, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the foreign policy organs of the state.[10] Nye and Welch also note that a characteristic of the digital age is the increase scope of transnational, non-state actors interacting across international borders.[11]

The conceptual framework thus seeks to examine these concepts and their interrelation in context on international relations.  Both international governing organizations (IGOs) and transnational non-state actors influence E-Governance by creating a form of transnational governance model.  Thismodel has several layers of institutional and organizational structures interacting at the individual, state and global level.[12]

Transnational governance has become increasingly important in the past two decades and consists of network-oriented non-state actors such as INGOs, activists among others. Experts have advised governments of the need to have regulatory frameworks that oversee multilayered systems like e-governance and issues with global impacts like cybersecurity[13]. Dingwerth[14] distinguishes this form of transnational governance from the state driven global governance by acknowledging the key role of non-state actors in coordination of cross border activities.  The paper argues that indeed non-state actors and state actors have crucial roles and influence each other.

To quote columnist Thomas Friedman[15] contemporary globalization goes farther, faster, cheaper and deeper. This means the world has become more interconnected.Stiglitz[16] posits that a knowledge based economy triggers innovations which then causes a chain reaction of new inventions. This spreads quickly due to the interdependence and interconnectedness of networks in a contemporary globalized world. As a result areas such as e-governance haveseen a proliferation of transnational non-state actors due to this characteristic of globalization.

Data in Figure 2 for IGOs from 1920–40 are from Michael Wallace and J. David Singer,“Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System,1815–1964: A Quantitative Description,” International Organization 24, no. 2 (1970): 239–87. Comparable data for INGOs from 1920–1950 are unavailable

Technology has created contributed to the network of complex interdependence discussed above. Governments has always been preoccupied with the flow of information between their borders. Historically the invention of the printing press by Johann Gutenberg empowered the European populace to be inspired by Martin Luther writings and thus leading to the Reformation movement.[17] The digital revolution which some scholars refer to as the “third industrial revolution” bares similarities to this historical event. The digital information age is based on rapid advances in communications, software and computers. This advances have changed the nature of national and global governance, sovereignty, and redistributed power among state and non-state actors. In this context non-state actors in economic and information networks have adapted faster than state actors to the changes mentioned.[18]

These non-state actors include NGOs, international organizations, commercial, and scientific agencies of all kinds. The transnational practices, global interactions, and networked technological structures of non-state actors have added a new crucial layer to their relationshipswith states. Analytically, the multiplicity of actors, which is well recognized by research on global governance is why the paper examines the emerging role of transnational actors.[19]

As technologies evolve some non-state actors are taking advantage of new software and hardware developments. Technical, organizational/institutional, and cultural weaknesses are being exploited by individuals, firms, non-state actors like terrorists and cybercrime syndicates as well as states not fully committed to the emerging international rules and norms.[20] Thus in response transnational non-state actors especially in the private commercial sector have come up with e-governance structures to deal with issues like cyber security.

Also new forms of socio-economic and political interaction, mostly based on new technologies, have also caused some scholars to reassess the role of non-state actors in global affairs. The digital age has increased the capacity of individuals to use ICTs for the collection and dissemination of information as well as for the transnational mobilization of like-minded individuals for various socio-political and economic purposes.[21]

 

3.0 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

For realists, the distribution of power in the world in the digital era can is viewed in a three-dimensional manner. On security issues, the world could be argued to be a unipolar one due to the power and military resources available to the USA. On economic issues, the international system is a multipolar one with USA, China, Japan, Europe, and others not mention creating a balance of power status quo in this dimension. The third, least influential dimension is one of the transnational relations or globalization (cyberspace) that crosses borders and is out of the scope of most states’ control.This dimension has a dispersed and even structure of power where non-state actors are as empowered as states in certain cases. In the context of this paper realist practitioners struggle with how to enforce E-governance on a global level as they do on a national level since most of the issues are out of their scope. Barnett and Duvall note that governance links to power through questions like ‘who governs?’, however, significantly in the context of e-governance, ‘how are institutions designed to check the potential abuse of power?’ Thus since most cyberspace issues are out of the scope states, the actor who controls the institutions which govern those issues is critical for realists.[22]

However realists and neo realist still remain skeptic of globalization. They doubt technology driven globalization such as that in the cyberspace dimension has transformed the processes and structures of the international system.[23][24][25][26] Other realists like Nye and Keohane argue that to maintain their dominance on issues around E-governance and cyber security on the global stage an approach of using soft power backed up by hard power is the ideal one considering the how abstract the internet or the cyberspace dimension is.[27] Realists also realize that, in a digital era where information flows freely, and transnational channels of contact have expanded across sovereign borders and global markets, non-state actors are playing a larger role in the international system.[28][29]

Theory Social constructivists believe that fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. Thomas Weiss argues that debates about global governance emerged from a growing realization amongst IR scholars in the 1970s and 1980s that both a realist state-based approach and liberal-institutionalist theories which focused on interdependence were failing to adequately incorporate the ‘vast increase, in both numbers and influence, of non-state actors and the implications of technology in an age of globalization’.[30] Through social globalization, cultures, ideas and people have spread worldwide aided by the advancement of technology. Indeed as constructivists would point out transnational political ideas such as the anti-apartheid, environmental, feminists, anticolonial and antislavery movements have affected how states construct their goals or use soft power.[31]

In this context science and technology has impacted how states relate to each other. Non-state actors have increasingly looked beyond the limited materialistic approach of states to work together on issues that require global coordination, for example, climate change or even e-governance of the cyberspace.[32] Wendt notes that the structures of human association are primarily by shared ideas rather than material ones.[33] Thus the digital era had given rise to ideas that have shaped how transnational non-state actors think that global issues are handled. This is in opposition to the realist school of thought.

Constructivists also challenge the neorealist school of thought that an anarchic international structure is what creates a self-help system where states pursue their selfish interests for survival. In a digital age, where especially information technology has changed the way individuals, states, public and private institutions social interact, constructivists argue this is what determines the structure of the international system rather than an assumption that human nature and by extension states are selfish actors. In the context of e-governance, which involves a multi-level structure, there are cases where international organizations are involved in the processes of social constructions of actors’ perceptions of their interests.

Finnemore, for example, analyzed the international structure in the context meaning and social value rather than of power. She gives an example in her research of how states created science bureaucracies due to the influence UNESCO a non-state actor.[34][35]

Regime theory has been advanced in response to the mutual constraints imposed by nuclear weapons, increased technological interconnections, and trans-boundary flows between nations[36]. Advances in science and technology has led to an interconnectednesswhich has provided opportunities for state and non-state actors to affect others on a global scale.  Keohane notes that institutions of global governance need to limit the negative aspects of this decentralized actions.[37]

Other major strands of international relations theories perceive transnational actors differently, according to their stance on the role of states and their assessment of changes in the international system. Among neo-realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, neo-marxist and constructivist theories, realists and neo-marxists have a negative attitude towards transnational non-state actors. For realists, state sovereignty and power are fundamental as analytical categories, thus the power of transnational actors is rarely acknowledged. While Marxists examine transnational relations on the basis of the internationality of class struggles. Critical theorists tend to be pessimistic about transactional actors; seeing them as market-based agents such as multinational corporates thus by extension an arm of capitalism. [38]

4.0 NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

 

As early as the 14th century medieval merchants developed Lex Mercatoria “Merchant Law” which was basically a private set of rules which governed the way they conducted business. Similarly, in this digital age, everyone from individual hackers to large MNCs are developing norms and code of the internet outside the control of state actors. Transnational non-state actors for example have created private space through the help of advances in encryption technology thus appropriated a public space (internet) for private use.[39]These private spaces have been dedicated to specific issues like human rights, technology, environment and entertainment. These spaces do not challenge state sovereignty but add another level of relations states do not effectively control.

Globalization enabled by advances in technology has transformed then role of transnational non-state actors. Traditional state dominated IGOS rely on hierarchical bureaucracies and government support. Whereas the networks formed by transnational non-state actors have a nonhierarchical structure and are more inclusive. These transnational networks include the private sector, governments and civil society who pursue common goals with global implications. While these transnational networks lack from political legitimacy or recognition, states and IGOs increasingly welcome their expertise.[40]

However there have been efforts from state actors in setting up regimes and institution through international law that can provide guidance in the areas of e-governance and cyber security.These include, in particular,

  • The 1992 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union[41]
  • The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime[42]
  • The 2009 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Information Security Agreement[43]
  • The 2014 African Union’s Cyber Security Convention[44]

Although important, these international treaties govern only a small portion of activities in the cyberspace dimension. The cyberspace dimension is not a lawless territory beyond the scope of international law but for now there is no complex regulatory mechanism governing state cyber activities. [45] Moreover, states tend to be reluctant to engage themselves in the interpretation and development of international law applicable to cyber space dimension for example cyber security. This voluntary retreat has created a power vacuum, enablingtransnational non-state actors to move into the space left by states and pursue various forms of ‘norm entrepreneurship’.[46]

Space exploration for several decades was a two state affair between the US and Soviet Union.In contrast cyberspace id primarily occupied by non-state actors like individuals, MNCs, civil society and more who have transnational connections[47]. Anonymity online of cyberspace activities and the dispersion of power to these non-state actors has been at the expense of state actors.[48]The complex environment created by the involvement of state and non-state actors in the cyberspace dimension has led legal uncertainty especially with regard to international law. Transnational non-state actors have now taken over the role of states in norm creation for international law in the area of cyberspace. These advances are driven primarily by academia and MNCs for example the Tallinn Manual project and the Microsoft’s cyber norms proposal. [49]

5.0 Empirical Analysis: ICANN, Microsoft and the Tallinn Manual as Case Studies in the Emerging Role of Transnational Non-state actors in E-Governance and Cyber Security

As noted before in this paper, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational non-state actors influence e-governance by creating a form of transnational governance model.  This model has several layers of institutional and organizational structures interacting at the individual, state and global level.[50] A key example of this multi-layered, hybrid transnational organization is ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers).This organization is a regulatory body in the information and telecommunications sector which deals with issues around internet governance and policy formulation.[51]Other examples the paper examines include Microsoft which is a multinational corporation and the Tallinn manual, a paper prepared by experts for the international community touching on the acceptable norms of the cyberspace dimension. This case studies examine the crucial role non-state actors have taken in managing the internet which some consider a common good for the use of all individuals regardless of their location.

Microsoft

In December 2014 Microsoft published a proposal entitled International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World.[52] Microsoft’s proposal was the first comprehensive attempt of setting specific standards of behavior. Despite being a private institution Microsoft was proposing six cyber security norms that were purporting to regulate the conduct of states.[53] The main purported aim of the white paper was to minimize thepossibility of that ICT products and services would be exploited by states as part of military operations. [54]

Tallinn Manual

In 2013 Professor Michael Schmitt led a group of international experts in publishing the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.[55] Although the project was hosted by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the content of the Manual is credited as reflecting the only the views of the experts rather than the states from which they originate.[56]

The Manual was prepared in the context of military paradigm and focused on law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed conflict (jus in bello).[57] The Manual identifies 95 rules that were adopted by consensus among the group of experts whose goals were to mirror customary international law.[58] The main aim of the Manual is to explain how existing legal norms apply to conduct in cyberspace.[59]

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 

ICANN through its processes makes keys decisions as to how the internet is use, how it is controlled and how is grows. Key mechanisms have been put in place to determine who participates in its governance, whose input is valued more and who are made accountable for decisions taken.  The decisions and processes of ICANN have the capacity to impact national economies, influence national identity formation and undermine sovereignty of states. This of course has deep implications for global politics.[60]

As a private sector organization, ICANN faces challenges that impact its governance since the policies it formulates are felt globally. This has brought about questions about its legitimacy since it’s a private body. With regard to international politics the fact that the Unites States government has a major role in the oversight of ICANN also dents it legitimacy as a neutral body. Questioning ICANN legitimacy has implications for US power since it is through the internet that the US leveraged the growth of its economy globally. The concept of legitimacy is key to this case study since it helps us to understand the soft power approach the US as a hegemon has taken towards governance ICANN. Other states were uncomfortable with the US hegemony over Internet governance since they felt it would threaten their interests.[61] As the political nature of Internet governance became clear other states questioned whose interests were being promoted by ICANN’s processes and the US’s influence on key decisions about technology.[62]

The US government ultimately faced challenges to its legitimacy as the hegemonic power in ICANN. This was because other states did not want to allow the US to have unilateral control of system most of the world relied on.[63]However the US realized the potential of ICANN as a source of power. They were able to shape Internet governance to promote their agenda of economic growth. This led to the expansion of US economic might globally especially after the end of the Cold war.[64]But  this strategy led to a struggle for power for the US and a struggle for legitimacy for ICANN. The US negotiated a series of concessions with the international community which led to it giving up control over Internet governance for ICANN to take charge. This was the only way US could get legitimate support for its global economic agenda without undermining it material power objectives.[65]

The issue of internet governance and by extension e-governance and who control it relies on legitimacy. However due to the selfish, self-help nature of the international system state control over governance structures would reduce its legitimacy. In contrast when states relinquish control and allow non-state actors, experts to set up the structures a degree of legitimacy is attached to that process.[66][67]

 

 

 

 

6.0 CONCLUSION

Decisions made about how the cyberspace is used, how it grows and how it is controlled tend to be mostly out of the scope of states and non-state actors alike. Howeveras examined by the paper using examples of e-governance and cybersecurity, states are no longer the only prominent actors in global issues. Globalization and the advancement of science and technology has led to the emergence of key roles for non-state actors to fulfil on the global stage. E-governance structures with clear processes, rules and norms need to be institutionalized to determine who participates in governance, whose voices count and which decision-makers are held accountable. These processes and decisions affect national economies, impact on national identity formation and undermine sovereignty in some critical ways.[68] Indeed, they have profound political implications. It is crucial that decisions makers both from state and non-state actors work together to create the institutions which will govern the cyberspace. Both state and non-state actors also need to ensure that the institutions governing the cyberspace are inclusive since this will ensure the processes of rulemaking and decision making are considered legitimate on the global stage.

 

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Djelic, Marie-Laure and Kerstin Sahlin‐Andersson. Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006

Finnemore, Martha. “International organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.” International Organization 47, 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 565-597.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkin. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 1998

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Nye, Joseph S., and David A. Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Boston: Pearson, 2017

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Rugman, Alan M.  The End of Globalization. New York: Random House, 2001

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Schmitt, Michael N.  Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare: prepared by the International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 6th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016

Sigholm, Johan. “Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations.” Journal of Military Studies, 2013 4, 1, pp.9–23.

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Walt, Stephen M.  Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005

 

Weiss, Linda. The Myth of the Powerless State. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998

Weiss, Thomas G. “Governance, Good Governance, and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly, 21, 5, (October 2000): 795–814

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[1]Joseph S. Nye, and David A. Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history. (Boston : Pearson, 2017), p.333

[2]Stephen Krasner., Sovereignty.Foreign Policy. (2001) 121: 24

[3]Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph P. Nye., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” .Foreign Affairs.(1998) 77 (5): 81–94.

[4]Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?”, Center for Global Development. CGD Working Paper 314. Washington, DC, 2013.

[5]https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/go.od-governance.pdf

[6]Sharon S. Dawes,“The Evolution and Continuing Challenges of E-Governance,”Public Administration Review (2008) 68:86-102.

[7]https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cybersecurity

[8]ITU. 2009. Overview of Cybersecurity. Recommendation ITU-T X.1205. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

[9] economist.com, 2010

 

[10] Robert O. Keohaneand Joseph P. Nye, Eds., Transnational relations and world politics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.11

[11]Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history (Boston: Pearson, 2017), p.346

[12]Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin‐Andersson., Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation. (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

[13] Thiel, Markus and Jeffrey Maslanik , Transnational Actors Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2010

[14]Klaus Dingwerth,The new transnationalism. (New York, Palgrave, 2007), p.2

[15]Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. (New York. Picador, 2012)

[16]Joseph E. Stiglitz, Intellectual property rights, the pool of knowledge, and innovation. (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014)

[17]Nye and Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history, 329.

[18]Daniel, Bell. The cultural contradictions of capitalism, (New York, BasicBooks, 2001)

[19]James N. Rosenau. Governance in the twenty-first century. Global Governance (1995) 1(1), 13–43.

[20]Chris C. Demchak and Peter J. Dombrowski,”Rise of a CyberedWestphalian Age: The Coming Decades,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.104

[21]Chris C. Demchak and Peter J. Dombrowski,”Rise of a CyberedWestphalian Age: The Coming Decades,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.104

[22]Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.249-272

[23]Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,1998)

[24]Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in question (Cambridge, MA: Polity,1999)

[25]Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002)

[26]Alan M. Rugman, The End of Globalization. (New York: Random House, 2001)

[27]Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), chap.2

[28]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs 77  (September- October 1998):81-94

[29]Joseph S. Nye, Jr., National Interest in the Information Age (New York, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1990)

[30]Thomas G.Weiss “Governance, Good Governance, and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly, 21, 5, (October 2000): 795–814

[31]Joseph S. Nye, and David A. Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history (Boston: Pearson, 2017), p.300

[32]John Baylis, The Globalization of World Politics.(Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc,2011) p.237

[33]Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.8-15

[34]Martha Finnemore., “International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and science policy,” International Organization 47, 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 565-597

[35]Stefan Fritsch,” Conceptualizing the Ambivalent Role of Technology in International Relations: Between Systemic Change and Continuity,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.125

[36]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997)

[37]Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political ScienceReview 95, 1, 2001, pp.1–13

[38]Markus Thiel and Jeffrey Maslanik,  Transnational Actors Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, Mar 2010

[39]SaskiaSassen, “On the Internet and Sovereignty,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5, Spring 1998, p. 551

[40]Robert J. Holton, Global Networks (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008)

[41]Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (concluded 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994) 1825 UNTS 143 (hereinafter ‘ITU Constitution’).

[42]Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2004)

[43]Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (signed 16 June 2009, entered into force 5 January 2012) (‘Yekaterinburg Agreement’).

[44]African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (signed 27 June 2014) AU Doc EX.CL/846(XXV).

[45]Oona A. Hathaway et al, “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” California Law Review100, 2012 pp.817-882

[46]Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkin, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998)

[47]Johan Sigholm, “Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations,” Journal of Military Studies, 20134, 1, pp.9–23

[48]Kubo Macak, “Is the international law of cyber security in crisis?,”in Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace: International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy, ed.Ziolkowski Katharina  (Tallinn, Estonia : NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2013),127-139.

[49]Kubo Macak, “Is the international law of cyber security in crisis?,” 127-139.

[50]Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin‐Andersson, Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

[51]Klaus, Dingwerth, The New Transnationalism (New York: Palgrave,2007) p.3

[52]Angela McKay et al, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World (Microsoft 2014) <http://aka.ms/cybernorms>.

[53]Angela McKay et al, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-DependentWorld (Microsoft 2014) <http://aka.ms/cybernorms> 2–3.

[54]Suzanne Choney, ‘6 Proposed Cybersecurity Norms Could Reduce Conflict’, Microsoft: The Fire Hose

(5 December 2014) <https://blogs.microsoft.com/firehose/2014/12/05/6-proposed-cybersecurity-normscould-reduce-conflict>.

[55]Michael N. Schmitt , Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare: prepared by the International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 6th ed.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.) p.42

[56]Ibid.,11.

[57]Ibid., 5.

[58]Ibid., 6.

[59]Ibid., 1.

[60]Madeline Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations: The Irony of the Information Age (New York :Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.117

[61]Stephen M. Walt, “Taming American Power,” Foreign Affairs, 2005 84, 5, p.107

[62]Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations, p.117.

[63]Ibid.,118.

[64]Ibid., 119.

[65]Ibid., 119.

[66]Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S.Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005)

[67]Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s OnlySuperpower Can’t Go It Alone(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

[68]Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations, p.117

 

By Tuesday Orina Masaki

The basis on which the assertion of a state’s jurisdiction may be grounded.

“As a general rule, a State’s prescriptive jurisdiction is unlimited and a State may legislate for any matter irrespective of where it occurs, (even if in the territory of another State) or the nationality of the persons involved,”  ANON.

The article below discusses the bases on which the assertion of a state’s jurisdiction may be grounded.

 

Introduction:

The concept of territory is of great significance in the analysis of the international legal system. Indeed a key development of international law has been the basis on which a state has exclusive authority over a defined territory. This is a fundamental concept of international law.[1]The development of the norm of respect of states’ territoriality, which is also a source of international law, has helped to address the challenges of territorial disputes which have been a major source of conflict in the relations between states.[2]  In the early centuries of the Westphalian order acquisition of territory was one of the major motivations of foreign policy. Most wars concerned acquisition of territory which led to a change of territory. These practices were reflected in the legal norms concerning the legitimacy of conquest.[3]

In the 19th century during the age of nationalism, intellectual concepts such as sovereignty and national self-determination altered people’s views concerning the legitimacy of territorial conquests.[4] The assertion of this moral change took the form of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant whose approval constituted the beginning of states’ formal support for the territorial integrity norm. Woodrow Wilson’s 14th point urged the members of the League to respect and preserve territorial integrity against external aggression and also respect and preserve the existing political independence of all its members. In the post-WWII era, the UN encouraged the acceptance of the norm of sovereignty-as-territorial integrity. The UN charter of 1945 affirmed states’ are obligated not to use force to alter states’ boundaries.

Barnett and Finnemore on the other hand argue that territory is historically contingent and the concept only rose to prominence in the 17th century owing to the centralization of administrative power within the State.[5] Since then, however, there are various modes of acquisition of title to territory recognized in international law which can alter states’ boundaries. They include Boundary treaties and boundary awards, the exercise of effective control (occupation and prescription), cession, conquest and use of force (annexation), accretion (avulsion).[6] The state’s control of a defined territory is based on the concept of sovereignty, except for certain exemptions, where a state can exercise this control beyond its territory. This paper argues that a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction is unlimited based on evidence of laws passed and evidence where states were not limited by territory or nationality to exercise jurisdiction.

The Nature of Jurisdiction

In general, jurisdiction allows states to give effect to the sovereign independence which they are endowed within a global system of formally equal states, through stating what the law is relating to persons or activities in which they have a legal interest.

Jurisdiction relies on the territorial dimension of sovereignty. A State’s jurisdictional assertions within its territory are in principle lawful, while assertions outside its territory are presumptively unlawful. This emphasis on territoriality is a reflection of the persistent Westphalian bias of the international legal order. However, the position of this paper is that with the advent of the 21st century and attributes which are unique to it like technological advancements which do not adhere to the traditional physical limitation of territory, states, and non-state actors are exceedingly acting beyond their physical jurisdictions. In an increasingly globalized world, the internet and the technology supporting it has made territoriality obsolete, in the subjective sense that the scope and level of interaction of individuals is now worldwide. However objectively states have not yet surrendered their claim to territorial jurisdiction. Indeed core concepts in international relations such as national interest, national security, and key theories like realism that assert the importance of the state as a self-interested actor within an anarchic, self-help international system remain evermore relevant today.[7] As a result, jurisdictional analyses have remained centered on territorial connections, even where such connections become increasingly artificial, e.g., in the case of essentially non-territorial cyberspace, or global climate change.

However, the traditional state-centric notion of territorial jurisdiction has had its challenges. In pre-modern times sovereignty was conceived of in a more tribal or community sense: people were subject to the laws of the community or tribe to which they belonged, rather than those of the territory on which they resided at a given moment.[8] Recently this non-state-centric concept of jurisdiction has been revived where individuals identify with transnational communities rather than with territorially-bound states, and on this basis, they are advocating for an overhaul of the ‘obsolete’ territory-based jurisdictional scheme.[9]

With these two different positions in mind, there are two dimensions observable in the law of jurisdiction, the negative dimension where states are in principle not allowed to assert jurisdiction over affairs that are in the domain of other states, and the positive dimension where states may sometimes be obliged to exercise jurisdiction especially in respect of values dear to the international community. This paper supports the latter positive dimension.

Bases on the assertion of State Jurisdiction

State jurisdiction is the capacity of a state under International Law to prescribe the rules of law, (legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction), enforce the prescribed rules of law (executive jurisdiction), and adjudicate (judicial jurisdiction). This jurisdiction the paper argues may extend beyond its territory, irrespective of where issues occur or the nationality of the persons involved. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to regulate people, property, and transactions or to prescribe conduct usually through the passage of laws or regulations. It is on the basis of this that there are principles upon which the State can assert its jurisdiction within and beyond its boundaries.

The principle of territorial jurisdiction is derived from the concept of state sovereignty and is the most dominant. It asserts a state’s right to exercise jurisdiction is universally recognized. However, on transboundary issues, two competing principles arise the subjective territorial principle and the objective territorial principle. This issue has tended to be ambiguous. For example in the Lotus case the Permanent Court of International Justice rule in favor of the objective territorial principle while the Lotus principle was overturned by article 11(1) of the High Seas

Convention, 1958 which was in favor of the subjective territorial principle. [10][11]

Apart from territorial jurisdiction, the law of prescriptive jurisdiction features a number of principles that allow states to exercise jurisdiction on an extraterritorial basis, especially in criminal law. These principles are usually premised on a link with the asserting state, notably nationality (the active and passive personality principles, which tie jurisdiction to the nationality of the perpetrator and the victim respectively), or political independence (the protective or security principle).[12]The universality principle, in contrast, premises jurisdiction on the nature (gravity) of the crime rather than on a particular nexus with a state, although in practice universal jurisdiction is often only exercised when the alleged perpetrator is present in the state’s territory.[13]

The basis for unlimited state’s prescriptive jurisdiction 

This paper asserts that prescriptive jurisdiction should be unlimited and there are certain cases in which this argument can be supported. The principle of universal jurisdiction which is considered a universally recognized principle can render any conflicting treaty void. The basis for this presumption is the concept of Jus Cogens[14] which states a treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.[15] Therefore a state should have prescriptive jurisdiction for offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,[16][17] and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where no other bases of jurisdiction is present.

Due to globalization and an increase in cross-border movements of goods, services, communication, people, and capital, the fundamental nature of jurisdictional immunity of states has changed and has led to the first categorical exception to the rule: the commercial exception.[18] The commercial exception is based on the doctrine of restrictive immunity, under which immunity is available as regards governmental activity, but not where the state is engaging in commercial activity[19]. For example, the Supreme Court of Austria in 1950,[20] in a comprehensive survey of practice, concluded that in the light of the increased activity of states in the commercial field the classic doctrine of absolute immunity had lost its meaning and was no longer a rule of international law. This means states could pursuit prescriptive jurisdiction especially with regard to cases of a commercial nature.

 

 

Challenges of unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction

It will be prudent to note that unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction has its challenges that can be overcome if appropriately addressed. The argument of this paper is that this concept tends to be used for selfish gain by states which is rational considering the anarchic nature of the international system. The unilateral exercise of jurisdiction by states, or regional organizations, is a trend that will feature in the practice of international law as global problems start to become remodeled in local terms.[21] However, as mentioned above, due to the anarchic and self-help nature of the international system such unilateralism leads to abuse by economically and politically powerful states.

The whole question of jurisdiction is complex, not least because of its relevance but also due to constitutional issues and conflict of laws rules. International law has attempted to set down rules dealing with the limits of a state’s exercise of governmental functions, conflict of laws (or private international law) which attempts to regulate cases involving foreign elements, and whether a particular country has jurisdiction to determine the question.

The practice of judicial deference to the foreign policy prerogatives of the political branches of government limits the contribution judicial decisions can make as a key source jurisprudence in international law especially within this context, the area of prescriptive jurisdiction. Stronger states tend to contemptuously disregard the pursuit of unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction by weaker states against them and this behavioral pattern complements the nature of an anarchic self-help international system. On the same note when the tables are turned and it’s the stronger states in pursuit of unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction they usually tend to succeed. For example, the U.S. Supreme court in its own word protects “against unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” In reality, however,  the presumption is a matter of judicial deference to the foreign policy prerogatives of the political branches, as congress rather than the judiciary “is likely to have superior informational and technical expertise on how to make a determination” whether a statute should have extraterritorial application. In other words, US courts may be at a disadvantage wouldn’t want their judicial decisions to be in conflict with the foreign policy objectives of other branches of the US government.[22]

 

Conclusion.  

The state ultimately has valid bases on which it can have unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction but adherence to customary laws, treaties and conventions is crucial for order in an anarchic international system. As examined unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction is a dynamic concept touching on foreign policy, commercial, and human rights issues. There are two opposing forces where unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction can be used as a tool of achieving a state’s selfish foreign policy objectives as opposed to a noble cause where it can be used to address for example the pursuit of justice in cases of human rights abuses, genocide and war crimes that occur outside a state’s territorial jurisdiction.

There is also the area of Lex Ferenda dealing with future laws where issues arising in the 21st century around areas of, technology, intellectual property, and transnational organizations or movements, can be addressed by setting up regulatory regimes aided by the existing structures of international law. Understanding the concept of unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction will be crucial since these abstract issues which do not adhere to territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty will definitely create tension with the existing state-centric international legal system.

 

 

REFERENCES

 

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951.

 

Barnett Michael and Finnemore Martha, “The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999)

 

Berman, Paul S. “Global Legal Pluralism” Southern California Law Review 80 (2007): 1155-1237

 

Buxbaum Hannah L. “Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict” The American Journal of Comparative Law 57, no. 3 (2009): 631-676

 

Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004, 128 ILR, p.239

 

Gottman, Jean. The Significance of Territory. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1973.

 

Kassan, Shalom. “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ancient World” American Journal of International Law 29, no. 2 (1935): 237-247

 

Korman, Sharon. The right of conquest: the acquisition of territory by force in international law and practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

 

Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 3rd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

 

Shaw, Malcolm N.  International Law. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 2008.

 

The Lotus case PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927.

 

The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945, Article 6

 

Vasquez, John. The War Puzzle. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

 

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) 179, 367 Article 53

 

 

 

 

[1] Jean, Gottman, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973).

[2] John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss, 1997).

[3] Ibid

[4] Sharon Korman, The right of conquest: the acquisition of territory by force in international law and practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[5] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999)

[6] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.495-502

[7]Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (3rd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[8] Shalom Kassan, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ancient World” American Journal of International Law 29, no. 2 (1935): 237-247

[9] Paul S. Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” Southern California Law Review 80 (2007): 1155-1237

[10] Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86

[11] The Lotus case PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927; 4 AD, p. 23, 30

[12] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.652-668

[13]  Ibid

[14] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) 179, 367 Article 53

[15] Ian Brownlie, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p.1138

[16] The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945, Article 6

[17] Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004, 128
ILR, p. 239, www.sc-sl.org/Documents/Taylor/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf.

[18]Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), The Charkieh (1873) p.702 n19

[19] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.704

[20] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.704-7005 Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia 17 ILR, p. 155.

[21] Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict” The American Journal of Comparative Law 57, no. 3 (2009): 631-676

[22] Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013)

 

By Tuesday Orina Masaki

SIGNIFICANCE OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Academic research should ideally have an ontological foundation as the basis for the subsequent epistemological approach chosen. A major problem of international studies is the diverse and competing paradigms that inform the international agenda. History and philosophy are key to addressing this diversity through ontological assumptions and foundational questions about the nature of people, the broad characteristics of the state, and of international society.[1]

There are a variety of reasons why research in international studies is crucial but this paper will briefly examine two. First is the conjectural nature of domestic policies which tends to undermine international studies as a whole.[2] This means there is a need for systematic and methodical aggregation of domestic policies whilst ensuring there is equitable recognition of contributions from the sources which will be assumed to be majorly state actors. This brings us to the second reason which is the dominant eurocentric view of African history which has meant that African scholars tend to acquiesce to foreign literature in international studies. The significance of academic research in international studies to the African context should be to counterbalance theories and literature that legitimizes Anglo-American imperialism in International studies.[3]

For the purpose and context of this paper if we examine positivist and post-positivist epistemology, whichever approach is taken, realism has been the ontological disposition of how the West and has related with Africa. The continuous dependence of African scholars on Eurocentric epistemology means they cannot untangle themselves from the intellectual imperialism prevalent in African epistemology. This is compounded by the conjectural nature of sources of information available to international studies even if a thorough positivist approach is taken.

Documents available for research in international studies and specifically international relations seldom bequeath truthful information to historians or academicians. They are usually produced as instruments of political action. Academic research touching on sensitive areas like national security is rarely available and access tends to be limited to government bureaucrats.[4]

To further illustrate the significant contribution academic research in international studies can make we can examine the diverse impact of international relations on science and technology and vice versa. Weiss posits that Science and technology not only pervades the issues with which the international system must deal with, but also have a fundamental influence on the overall architecture of the system itself. For this reason, it is of critical importance that the impacts of science and technology become part of mainstream research in international studies.[5] This is also an area not yet encumbered epistemologically by Eurocentric bias and conjecture. Science and technology indeed have been the launchpad of emerging powers like China and India.

In conclusion, it is clear we cannot disapprove the existing Eurocentric approach to research however we can critic it. Using Hegel’s dialectic method can be a logical approach taking into account the different cultures, religions, political and economic systems that encompass the international environment and their contribution.  Egalitarian structures also need to be put in place to collate the different works of research that are churned globally. Also, a clear and inclusive redefinition of the ontology of international studies will provide direction to how epistemology will be carried out.

[1] Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017), 10

[2] Cyril E. Black, “Accessibility of Government-Sponsored Research in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), pp. 320-324

[3] Olukayode A. Faleye, “Africa and International Relations theory: acquiescence and responses,” Journal of Globalization Studies, No. 5(2014)

[4]  Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, “Problems of Research in International Relations,” International Studies 3,(1961):3

[5] Charles Weiss, “Science, technology and international relations,” Technology in Society 27,(2005) 309

 

By

Tuesday Orina Masaki

 

The Enemy Within: The Lack of Strategy and Regulation in African Foreign Policy

BY TUESDAY MASAKI

There is a new scramble for Africa but the difference with this one is that it is fueled by the perpetrators as well as the victims. Long gone are the days when Africa was curved up at Berlin Conference 1884-85, in meeting called by Portugal and organised by Otto von Bismarck.  Africa still lives with the consequences of  its outcome, the General Act of the Berlin Conference, which has had  an effect on how Africa has related with global community till today. That relationship between Africa and Europe was asymmetrical leaving the latter better off with the import of cheap raw material and the former lacking meaningful social,economic and political structures in place after the end of colonialism.  It is these weak structures and lack of accountable institutions that now allow a mutual, ‘symmetrical’ relationship fueled by avarice to flourish between between Africa and the global community more specifically China.

This avarice looks quite reasonable when we examine it through the prism of mutual trade agreements which China for example signs with African states. China has actually been quite fair to African countries by not imposing conditions like Structural Adjustment Policies which African countries had and must follow in order to qualify for loans from for example the IMF.  The main issue with the trade agreements that China has with African states is that African leaders are not doing them in the best interest of their people but rather for themselves. China on their part don’t mind giving kickbacks and cutting corners if they get favorable access to mineral resources and a market for their finished goods in these African countries. The low cost China offers for tenders of big infrastructural tenders means this relationship between Africa and China is bound to continue as African countries seek to develop their fledgling economies while balancing the pressures of competing in a cutthroat  global economy. This lack of strategy and interest in only personal gain rather than national interest by the leadership of the various government institutions, ministries and ultimately heads of state means Africa is negotiating trade policies with the wrong objectives in mind. The irony is China for example is a one party state while most African states they trade with have multi-party systems. The multiple political parties within  African states through ethnic kinship and cronyism battle for the resources left post colonialism at the expense of national interest. China with the help of the one party state act as a unit in planning and executive to achieve is foreign policy objectives. This contradiction serves to compounds the crisis of identity of African foreign policy from the domestic structures of local politics, governance and economic development which form policy to the global ideological structures of economic principles and political philosophies among which states are forced to chose in order to survive the anarchic global system.

 

 

With the national economic interest of African states at stake, leaders need to fight the enemy within, corruption, cronyism and misappropriation of government resources. This step will first stem the waste of already scarce resources through for example  practices such as the inflation of tender prices for state infrastructure projects. Africa in general needs a paradigm shift in the area of National Security by securitizing their national resources against plunder from within and outside their sovereign borders. More than territorial sovereignty, the economic sovereignty of African states should be among at the top most core objectives of African foreign policy in the 21st century.

Other areas such as the environmental security of Africa’s natural resources are and will suffer if we do not take action. Economic decisions need to be examined via a fair and  balanced cost-benefit analysis on how the business practices of foreign trade partners may affect Africa’s natural resources. This is relevant for example when dealing with issues on environmental pollution, sustainable utilization of natural resources and wildlife conservation. A vivid illustration of this statement is the plan by the Kenyan government to build East Africa’s first coal plant near the coastal town of Lamu. Firstly, this decision does not make sense because the plant will pollute an environmentally pristine ecosystem and beach which is a tourist attraction, secondly Kenya already has a diverse portfolio of alternative energy sources which are clean and sustainable for example geothermal, natural gas, wind – such as the Lake Turkana Wind Farm and a solar photovoltaic (PV) project in the northeastern city of Garissa. It will be fair to acknowledge that some of these energy alternatives are not immediately viable but in the context of strategy for future competitiveness in the global economy which is moving away from coal and non renewable energy sources like fossil fuel to renewable energy sources like wind and solar, Kenya is making a bad decision.

More than ever African foreign policy analysts, theorists and practitioners are needed to provide strategies that protect African states in the current competitive and anarchic global economy. Objectives need to be in place and irrespective of which political party is in power they need to implemented to the end. Even with democratic elections and adoption of liberal economy principles, Africa still risks stagnation and achieving minimal progress overall in the 21st century. In the global economy we know who are our competitors, we also know their strengths and weaknesses, we know the structure and operating environment of the Global economy, but most important we know our own strengths and weaknesses. Africa needs to wage a war with the enemy within only then will the enemy outside be tamed.

 

Author works as a Foreign Policy Analyst for Kineni Consulting. www.kinenigroup.com 

 

Chinese Smugglers Are Buying Up Hundreds of Thousands of Illegally Slaughtered African Donkeys

DISPATCH

Chinese Smugglers Are Buying Up Hundreds of Thousands of Illegally Slaughtered African Donkeys

JOHANNESBURG — The business proposal, though strange, seemed harmless and the profits too good to pass up. But within a few months, after being inundated with photographs from illegal slaughterhouses, Jeremy wished he had never stumbled into Africa’s newest and most peculiar commodity trade.

In one blurred frame, a man he didn’t recognize wielded a club, preparing to strike a donkey tethered beside him. A dead donkey lay a short distance away, blood seeping into the dirt. Another picture showed the man crouched in a bushy clearing, skinning a live animal.

“Please stop contacting me,” Jeremy, a Cape Town investor who asked not to be identified by his real name, replied. “I told you I’m not interested.”

A boyish South African finance graduate of East Asian heritage, Jeremy first learned of the booming trade in donkey skins in late 2015, when a visiting Chinese industrialist approached him saying he was looking to buy 5,000 hides per month.

“He was offering insane prices, like hundreds of dollars apiece,” Jeremy recalled. He immediately began looking for local partners, unaware he was entering an industry that, while not technically illegal in South Africa, is dominated by black-market suppliers.

Across the continent, the price of donkey skins has skyrocketed in the last five years, fueled by demand in China. Used mainly for transport and to haul cargo, donkeys cost as little as $8 per head before the boom. Now they can sell for more than $150 each, spawning an illicit economy worth tens of millions of dollars each year, based on conservative estimates.

From Nigeria to South Africa, syndicates have taken to raiding farms and smuggling donkey skins to Chinese middlemen, some of whom also deal in banned wildlife products like ivory. Other, less overtly criminal outfits scour the countryside for willing sellers while skirting export bans and other regulations on when and how the animals can be slaughtered. With African governments scrambling to control the trade, and commercial breeders not yet able to meet increased demand, informal supply chains are wreaking havoc on rural economies that depend on donkeys for transport, while fueling abuse of the animals themselves.

The great African donkey rush is being fueled by ejiao, a 2,500-year-old traditional Chinese remedy prepared with gelatin from the animals’ skins. Ejiao is prescribed for ailments including anemia, insomnia, and excessive menstrual bleeding, though there is little clinical evidence of its efficacy. It is also a popular ingredient in beauty products, including face creams and moisturizers. Two hundred and fifty-gram slabs of the substance, which resemble resinous chocolate bars, sell for up to $350 each; in special circumstances, the price can be as much as 10 times higher. These extravagant costs reflect systemic shortages and insatiable appetite in China, where ejiao production now consumes some 4 million skins each year.

In the last two decades, China’s donkey population — once the world’s largest — contracted from 11 million to less than 6 million, while per capita GDP increased almost tenfold, from just over $1,800 in 1995 to more than $14,000 in 2015. Rapid industrialization and urban migration greatly reduced the need for donkeys in rural areas, while rising affluence in cities boosted demand for consumer products like ejiao. The result has been a surge in skins imports from developing countries, often with scant regard for the suffering of donkeys or the lives of people who depend on them.

Traders and businessmen responded in a gold-rush style frenzy

Traders and businessmen responded in a gold-rush style frenzy,” the Donkey Sanctuary, a welfare organization based in England, wrote in a report on the trade published earlier this year.Jeremy had never heard of ejiao but was excited by the prospect of easy money. The owner of a small renewable energy firm, he had no experience dealing with livestock or exports, but in other respects he was ideally situated to enter the sector. His parents had emigrated from Taiwan years before he was born, and he’d grown up speaking Mandarin, meaning that he could communicate easily with Chinese importers.

But Jeremy needed donkeys, and to get them he turned to Claude, a stout Malawian man who claimed that he had access to an equine abattoir and a network of willing sellers. Claude, who asked not to be identified by his real name, asked Jeremy for a loan of $3,800 to procure the first batch of skins, which he suggested selling to a Chinese exporter named Liu Gin after the buyer who initially approached Jeremy pulled out. The loan was repayable in two weeks with 30 percent interest, meaning that Jeremy stood to pocket nearly $1,200.

“It was purely a business opportunity. Who would say no to that return?” he said. So he photocopied Claude’s ID book and residential lease to avoid being conned and asked his lawyer to draw up a comprehensive loan agreement. On Aug. 4, Jeremy transferred the money to Claude from his company account.

Claude had assured Jeremy that he was sourcing donkeys legally, but in reality he was operating an illicit skins-trading syndicate. While no laws explicitly forbid exporting donkey skins from South Africa, the industry is bound by strict animal welfare and food safety regulations, which require that the animals be slaughtered in registered abattoirs. Claude was buying donkeys directly from villagers and illegally butchering them on the spot — saving time and money by operating outside the law.

The South African government has clamped down on illegal outfits like Claude’s, making dozens of arrests for theft and animal cruelty in the last 18 months. Increasingly, authorities are finding that donkey smugglers have ties to organized crime. Last September, while rescuing 70 donkeys from a farm run by a skins-smuggling group, police discovered a stash of dried abalone, a South African shellfish species exported illegally by the ton to China in exchange for methamphetamines and other drugs.

Chinese and Taiwanese syndicates, collectively known as Triad gangs, have long profited from the illegal export of rhino horn, ivory, abalone, and precious minerals from South Africa, shipping drugs and migrants entering illegally in the opposite direction. When the donkey boom hit, it appears that these networks began dealing in hides as well.

“Chinese importers began asking about donkeys in 2014,” said a former South African trade consultant who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “There were seven companies each looking to buy around 10,000 skins a year. It was a big opportunity for rural development, but there were no frameworks to support legal trade. And when you can’t go legally, you go through the mafia.”

In addition to fueling criminal activity, the sudden spike in hide prices has made donkeys prohibitively expensive for rural farmers who rely on them. In Niger, for instance, average donkey prices jumped from $34 to $145 in just five years. Last September, after traders had shipped 80,000 skins in just nine months, Niger’s government joined Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso in banning further exports. Without intervention, “the animals will be decimated,” an unnamed Nigerien official told the BBC.

“If the trade can be regulated and monitored, then there is a genuine opportunity to create a viable export market,” said Eric Olander, a journalist who founded the weekly China in Africa Podcast. “But at present laws are unclear and unevenly enforced, with vulnerable rural communities threatened by surging prices and poaching.”

At the periphery of the syndicate that Jeremy unwittingly bankrolled was a slender Malawian immigrant in his late 20s named Sam. “A Chinese buyer was offering good money,” he said. “These guys needed help with their supply.”

A cash-strapped church caretaker, Sam began working as a fixer for Claude’s outfit, linking his buyers with farmers from villages outside Johannesburg. One day last August, he hired a minibus taxi and drove west of Johannesburg to a tiny rural settlement near the town of Ventersdorp. There he purchased 25 donkeys, recruiting a group of locals to help process the skins. They killed the animals one by one, knifing them at the base of the skull or striking them between the eyes with a hammer. Sam earned $75 that day, a small fraction of what the haul was worth.

When Jeremy learned that he’d financed a criminal enterprise, he quit the skins business completely. Claude’s syndicate collapsed less than six months later, in February, when police arrested Gin, the main buyer behind the operation, for falsely declaring a shipment of 300 skins at Johannesburg’s O.R. Tambo International Airport. Customs officials intercepted the shipment, which was destined for Hong Kong, after noticing a foul smell rising from wooden boxes labeled “cladding.” Four days later, police confiscated more than 1,000 skins from a farm Gin had allegedly rented outside the city.

Each of the confiscated skins would have fetched more than $500 in China, for a total of more than $650,000. It’s the kind of payday that keeps Chinese importers coming back despite the risks — and young men like Jeremy, Claude, and Sam clamoring for a share of the spoils.

“If I could sell skins, I wouldn’t be in this situation,” said Sam, who has fallen on hard times since the syndicate ended and is on the lookout for a new buyer. “I need to start trading again. Even five skins would be enough.”

TONY KARUMBA/AFP/Getty Images